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MCCULLOCH V. MARBURY 
Kermit Roosevelt III* and Heath Khan** 
Some are born great, some achieve greatness, and some have 
greatness thrust upon them. 
—William Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, II.V 
INTRODUCTION: MARBURY’S GREATNESS 
Marbury v. Madison is a great case.1 That much is 
undeniable. It is “widely regarded today as the most important 
case in American constitutional history.”2 Some enthusiasts go 
farther; in 1901, an Arkansas judge proclaimed it “the most 
important event in our history” apart from the formation of the 
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 1. Judicial statements to this effect appear as early as 1825, see People ex rel. Ewing 
v. Forquer, 1 Ill. 104 (Ill. 1825), and were picked up by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1893. 
See Noble v. Union River Logging R.R. Co., 147 U.S. 165, 171 (1893). Forquer, 
interestingly, displays some ambivalence. After describing the Marbury Court as “a 
tribunal filled with as enlightened and as able jurists as ever graced the judgment-seat in 
this or any other nation” and the opinion itself as “conspicuous for its luminous displays 
of deep research and constitutional learning,” the Illinois Supreme Court went on to note 
that the opinion “has not given universal satisfaction.” 1 Ill. 104 at 106. The next decision, 
Johnson v. United States, 13 F. Cas. 868 (D. Me. 1830) (Story, J.), calls Marbury great and 
explains that it is “great, not only from the authority which pronounced it, but also from 
the importance of the topics which it discussed … .” Id. at 873. References become more 
simply laudatory towards the end of the 18th century. See, e.g., Ex parte Lusk, 2 So. 140, 
144 (Ala. 1887) (referring to “the great case of Marbury v. Madison” without elaboration). 
When the Supreme Court first used the phrase, in Noble, it did not explain why Marbury 
was great. It invoked Marbury to support a distinction between discretionary executive 
acts, which were unreviewable, and ministerial acts, which could be reviewed. (As 
discussed below, this was Marbury’s main early significance. Its emergence as a great case 
about judicial review came later. See, e.g., Ragland v. Anderson, 100 S.W. 865, 868 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 1907) (“It has never been doubted in this country since the great case of Marbury v. 
Madison [citation omitted] that an act of the legislative part of the government which is 
contrary to the Constitution is void, and will be so held by the courts whenever brought to 
their attention.”).)  
 2. Davison M. Douglas, The Rhetorical Uses of Marbury v. Madison: The 
Emergence of a “Great Case,” 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 375, 376 (2003). 
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government.3 While the Supreme Court has never gone that far, 
it tends to invoke Marbury in high-profile and contentious cases: 
in the hands of the Justices, Marbury is a confidence-booster, an 
important support for the exercise of judicial review.4 If there is 
one proposition that constitutional scholars and judges of all 
stripes can agree on, it is that “Marbury’s place in the 
constitutional canon is secure.”5 
But why? How did Marbury become great? What does it 
stand for? And—perhaps most important—does it deserve its 
lofty standing? 
Earlier articles have explored some of these questions. There 
has been substantial recent scholarship on the process by which 
Marbury became a great case and the construction of its 
meaning—the proposition it stands for in contemporary legal 
discourse.6 We build on that research to create a platform from 
which to explore the last question. In line with Voltaire’s 
suggestion that if God did not exist, it would be necessary to 
 
 3. Id. (quoting 3 JOHN MARSHALL: LIFE, CHARACTER AND JUDICIAL SERVICES 
130 (John F. Dillon ed., 1903). 
 4. The first invocation of Marbury in support of invalidation of a federal statute 
appears to be Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 583 (1895). Marbury 
gets a passing mention in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887), where the Court 
ended up upholding a state law. In more recent history, Marbury gets prominent mention 
in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1958) and thereafter appears with high frequency 
in controversial decisions where the Court (or individual Justices) might naturally seek 
support for the exercise of judicial review. See, e.g.,  Janus v. American Federation of 
State, County, and Mun. Employees, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2486 n.27 (2018); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 
137 S. Ct. 1843, 1874 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring); Nation Labor Relations Board v. 
Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 525 (2014); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703–05 
(1974); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 567 (1985) (Powell, J., 
dissenting); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 833 n.40 (1988); James B. Beam 
Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991); Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 703 (1997); 
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277 (2004); King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015); 
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 353–54 (2006); United States v. Windsor, 570 
U.S. 744, 762 (2013); Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310, 365 
(2010). In some of these decisions, Marbury is cited as support for not invalidating a 
challenged law—a consequence, we will suggest, of the fact that Marbury provides no 
guidance as to when judicial review should be deferential and when it should be aggressive. 
See infra Part III. 
 5. Amanda Rinderle & Keith E. Whittington, Making a Mountain out of a Molehill? 
Marbury and the Construction of the Constitutional Canon, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 823, 
824 (2012). See also, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional 
Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963, 1010 (1998) (describing Marbury as “[t]he crown jewel in the 
constitutional canon”). 
 6. In particular, see Douglas, supra note 2; Whittingon & Rinderle, supra note 5. See 
also Robert M. Casale, Revisiting one of the Law’s Great Fallacies: Marbury v. Madison, 
89 CONN. BAR. J. 62 (2015).   
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invent him, it turns out that Marbury became great because it was 
needed. People in the legal community—judges, scholars, and 
advocates—felt that a great case was needed to promote 
aggressive judicial review. And so they made one. 
The use of Marbury as support for judicial review—and more 
particularly, as support for judicial invalidation of government 
acts—did not follow immediately or ineluctably from the decision 
itself. Instead, as we describe in Part I, it appears to have begun 
during the Lochner era, as advocates of aggressive judicial review 
of economic regulation looked for support for their preferred 
stance. After the Lochner jurisprudence went down to defeat in 
the New Deal era, Marbury too diminished in prominence. It 
returned in the Warren Court era, beginning with Cooper v. 
Aaron and continuing thereafter. In some cases, we find it 
deployed by opponents of judicial invalidation, or by both sides 
of the decision. Everyone agrees that Marbury is important; 
everyone wants to have Marbury on their side—even if they 
cannot agree on what it means. 
This much has been said before. The novel move we make is 
to offer a normative assessment of the canonization of Marbury. 
Our argument is that Marbury cannot sustain the burden its role 
demands. The early ascension of Marbury came as part of an era 
of judicial review now roundly rejected by the Supreme Court and 
commentators alike.7 Marbury has come back, miraculously 
untainted by its association with Lochner.8 But, as we argue in 
 
 7. See, e.g., Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379 (2011) 
(identifying Lochner as one of four anti-canonical cases); Richard A.Primus, Canon,, Anti-
Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243 (1998). Lochner does have its defenders. 
See, e.g.,  David E. Bernstein, Lochner v. New York: A Centennial Retrospective, 83 WASH. 
U.L.Q. 1469 (2005).  We will suggest that Lochner’s bad reputation—like Marbury’s good 
one—is attributable more to subsequent mythologizing than the actual decision. See infra 
Part III. 
 8. Most of what we say in Parts I and II is relatively well known among law 
professors. See Casale, supra note 6, at 62 (stating that “scholars have known for years that 
this [conventional] understanding of Marbury [as establishing judicial review] is wrong”). 
We are, though, unsure about the extent to which professors or judges are aware of the 
historical connection between Marbury and Lochner. The scholarship that develops this 
connection, notably ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW (1989), is now relatively old; however, most legal scholarship still treats the two 
cases as bearing their conventional symbolic meaning—that is, as opposites. See, e.g., 
Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L. J. 243, 245 (1998) 
(contrasting Lochner and Plessy with Marbury and McCulloch). Judges, too, tend to 
invoke Marbury and Lochner as opposites—at least since Lochner acquired its modern 
meaning as a symbol of illegitimate judicial activism. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549, 566, 605 (majority relies on Marbury while dissent characterizes decision as akin 
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Part II, Marbury cannot escape Lochner, for Lochner (in its 
symbolic version) is simply the dark side of Marbury, no more 
separable than its shadow.9 
Marbury does enunciate or endorse (some form of) judicial 
review. But it has nothing to say about the crucial question of how 
judicial review should be exercised: when it should be aggressive 
and when it should be deferential.10 (This opacity or lack of 
content is why the Lochner Court, the Warren Court, and the 
Rehnquist/Roberts Court can all invoke Marbury for support, 
even though they have very different theories about the proper 
exercise of judicial review.) Indeed, if the question is about the 
proper level of deference rather than the existence or non-
existence of judicial review, Marbury is not a great decision at all. 
As we argue in Part III, it is a terrible one, worse even than 
Lochner.11 
Where does that leave us? It would be nice if there were a 
canonical early decision that enunciates the principle of judicial 
review and at the same time says something about when it should 
be aggressive and when it should be deferential. It would be nice 
if that opinion were written by the great Chief Justice John 
Marshall. And for teaching purposes—since the constitutional 
canon is constructed in large part through the selection of cases 
for casebooks—it would be nice if the decision illustrated both 
aggressive and deferential review. 
Fortunately, such a decision exists. As we explain in Part IV, 
it is McCulloch v. Maryland.12 The last part of the Article 
 
to Lochner); Compare In re Senate Resolution No. 2 Concerning Constitutionality of 
House Bill No. 6, 31 P.2d 325, 331 (Colo. 1933) (citing Marbury and Lochner together to 
support judicial invalidation). 
 9. Marbury cannot escape Lochner, we will argue, because while everyone agrees 
that judicial review is a good thing (the proposition that Marbury actually argues for), 
Marbury is actually invoked to support not the existence of judicial review but the 
invalidation of government acts. And everyone also agrees that some kinds of 
invalidation—the “judicial activism” now associated with Lochner—is bad. But because 
Marbury says nothing about how judicial review should be exercised, it provides no way 
to distinguish between good Marbury invalidations and bad Lochner ones. See infra Part 
III. 
 10. For an argument about the centrality of deference, see generally KERMIT 
ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM (2006).  
 11. Marbury is worse, we will argue, for two main reasons. First, unlike Lochner, it 
has no plausible explanation of why it chooses the aggressive version of judicial review. 
And second, unlike Lochner, it is a bad faith exercise in partisan political maneuvering. 
See infra Part III. 
 12. 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
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examines McCulloch, explaining why it succeeds where Marbury 
fails. McCulloch, we conclude, should replace Marbury in our 
constitutional canon as the symbol of judicial review. Whether 
this will occur in judicial opinions is, of course, up to judges, and 
we concede that law review articles may have limited impact on 
judicial practice. (It does, however, appear that law professors and 
legal activists are responsible for creating the Marbury to which 
judges now appeal.13) Thus we have an additional suggestion, 
which law professors can implement on their own. McCulloch 
should replace Marbury as the first case that students encounter 
in their constitutional law courses. 
As a starting point, we turn now to the story of Marbury. 
How did it become the decision it is today? 
I. MARBURY’S RISE 
In its fledging years, Marshall’s now-famous opinion was 
rarely cited in cases or treatises. This is likely because judicial 
review, the principle that eventually elevated Marbury to 
greatness, was widely accepted and commonly used in the years 
prior to Marbury.14 That is not to say there was no debate over the 
operation of judicial review and its scope – there was. But 
Marbury actually says very little about those issues.15 The issue for 
which Marbury has become famous—whether the power of 
judicial review exists at all—had been largely settled. The 
suggestion, occasionally seen in celebrations of the opinion, that 
Marbury created judicial review or was the first instance of its 
exercise is simply wrong.16 More striking, the arguments that 
Marbury marshals in favor of judicial review were not novel. 
 
 13. See infra Part I. 
 14. See William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 
455, 555 (2005) (“The fact that judicial review was exercised much more frequently than 
previously recognized in the years before Marbury helps explain why Marshall’s assertion 
of the power to exercise judicial review in the case elicited so little comment and also 
highlights the consistency between Marbury and the prior body of case law.”) 
 15. Not nothing—as we note later, Marbury distinguishes between unreviewable 
discretionary authority and reviewable ministerial acts, a distinction which was considered 
the most important part of the opinion for almost a century. It does not, however, say 
anything about when the Court’s review should be deferential and when it should be 
aggressive. 
 16. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 8 (1963) 
(stating that Marbury established judicial review as an institution “‘done’ at a given time 
and by a given act.”); Robert L. Clinton, The Strange History of Marbury v. Madison in the 
Supreme Court of the United States, 8 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 13, 17–18 (1989). 
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Marshall’s argument—and even his rhetorical flourishes—borrow 
from Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist 78 to an extent that would 
support charges of academic dishonesty in an undergraduate term 
paper.17 
Given that Marbury said nothing novel about judicial review, 
it is not surprising that up through the mid-nineteenth century the 
attention it garnered was for other aspects of its discussion. 
Marbury was cited largely for its analysis of the availability of 
mandamus and the scope of original jurisdiction.18 When the 
Supreme Court eventually found another occasion to exercise 
judicial review to invalidate an act of Congress in the infamous 
Dred Scott case, it did so without mention of Marbury.19 After a 
half-century drought, Dred Scott opened the floodgates of judicial 
review, as nineteen decisions invalidated acts of Congress 
between 1857 and 1893.20 In none of those cases, however, did the 
 
 17. Compare Marbury v. Madison (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the 
Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases 
must, of necessity, expound and interpret the rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the 
Court must decide on the operation of each.”), with THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (“The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the 
courts. … It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of 
any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an 
irreconcilable variance between the two, … the Constitution ought to be preferred to the 
statute ….”). 
 18. See e.g., WILLIAM ALEXANDER DUER, CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF 
THE UNITED STATES (rev. ed. 1856). What may be the first decision to call Marbury 
“great,” People Ex rel. Ewing v. Forquer, 1 Ill. 104(Ill. 1825), is focused on the availability 
of mandamus and displays some ambivalence even as to that. After describing the Marbury 
Court as “a tribunal filled with as enlightened and as able jurists as ever graced the 
judgment-seat in this or any other nation” and the opinion itself as “conspicuous for its 
luminous displays of deep research and constitutional learning,” the Illinois Supreme 
Court went on to note that the opinion “has not given universal satisfaction.” 1 Ill. 104 at 
106. See generally Douglas, supra note 2; Rinderle & Whittington, supra note 5; ROBERT 
LOWRY CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 120 (1989). 
 19. 60 U.S. 393 (1857). Had Marbury not existed, late-nineteenth century proponents 
of aggressive judicial review might have greater difficulty making their case, since Dred 
Scott quickly became part of the anti-canon: cases that discredit their associated doctrines. 
And had Dred Scott anticipated the Lochnerites by itself appealing to Marbury, it might 
have created a similar effect. One of the surprising things about Marbury, though, is the 
extent to which it has avoided guilt by association—it has not been tarnished by its 
invocation in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 583 (1895) and during 
the Lochner era. The most surprising thing to us, though, is that Marbury has avoided 
liability for its own guilt: it is held out as a great case despite being a terrible example of 
the proper role of courts in a constitutional democracy. See infra Part IV. 
 20. See Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893); Callan v. 
Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888); Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678 (1887); Boyd v. United States, 
116 U.S. 616 (1886); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); United States v. Harris, 106 
U.S. 629 (1883); Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879); United States v. Fox, 95 U.S. 670 
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Court cite Marbury. Presumably, doing so seemed neither 
necessary nor valuable to the opinion writers. When, then, did 
Marbury take the stage as support for the exercise of judicial 
review? 
Surprisingly, the answer originates in another infamous case, 
which former Supreme Court Chief Justice William Howard Taft 
believed did more to damage the Court’s prestige than any other, 
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. (1895).21 Pollock marked 
the Supreme Court’s first invocation of Marbury when using 
judicial review to invalidate a federal statute.22 The majority 
opinion in Pollock, a 5-4 decision, elicited strong rebukes from the 
dissenting Justices,23 incited controversy and led to both 
Democrats and Populists adopting anti-Court and anti-Marbury 
rhetoric in the elections of 1896.24 Ultimately, Pollock was 
reversed by a constitutional amendment (the sixteenth).25 
 
(1878); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876); United States v. R.R. Co., 84 U.S. 322 
(1873); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1872); Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. 113 (1871); 
United States v. DeWitt, 76 U.S. 41 (1870); Justices v. Murray, 76 U.S. 274 (1870); Hepburn 
v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603 (1870); Alicia, 74 U.S. 571 (1869); Reichart v. Felps, 73 U.S. 160 
(1868); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1867); Gordon v. United States, 69 U.S. 561 (1865); 
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). See Douglas, supra note 2 (listing cases) at 395 n.85.  
 21.  See Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 
(1999) (quoting 1 ARCHIBALD BUTT, TAFT AND ROOSEVELT 134 (1930)). A 
contemporaneous review of Pollock begins by setting itself up as a parallel to critiques of 
Dred Scott and describes the decision as “overrul[ing] in effect three direct adjudications 
made by [the Supreme Court] … and thereby cripple[ing] an important and necessary 
power and function of a coordinate branch of government [via] an opinion … that is 
contrary to what has been accepted as law for nearly one hundred years.” Francis R. Jones, 
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan and Trust Company, 9 HARV. L. REV. 198, 198 (1895). In 
addition to being widely viewed as poorly reasoned and incorrect, Pollock is one of the 
few Supreme Court decisions to be reversed by a constitutional amendment (the 
sixteenth). For discussion of its anti-canonical status, see Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 
125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 389 (2011). 
 22. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 583 (1895). Before this, the 
Supreme Court did discuss Marbury to support the Court’s power to review the 
constitutionality of state laws in Mugler v. Kansas, though it ultimately decided the state 
law in question was constitutional. 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887).  
 23. Justice Edward White, dissenting, argued that the decision was inconsistent with 
the idea of the Court as an institution independent of its membership—that is, that it 
looked like a political opinion rather than a judicial judgment. 157 U.S. 429 at 652 (White, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that [t]he fundamental conception of a judicial body is that of one 
hedged about by precedents which are binding on the court without regard to the 
personality of its members”); Id. at 651 (arguing that “[i]f the permanency of [the Court’s] 
conclusions is to depend upon the personal opinions of those who, from time to time, may 
make up its membership, it will inevitably become a theater of political strife, and its action 
will be without coherence or consistency”). 
 24. See Douglas, supra note 2, at 395–97. 
 25. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
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Despite the reaction, opinion-writers apparently absorbed 
the lesson that Marbury helped: after Pollock, invocations of 
Marbury increased notably.26 While Pollock’s opponents 
“regarded Marbury as a “usurpation” of legislative authority, and 
judicial review as an unwarranted power,” its defenders hailed 
Marbury as fundamental to American liberty.27 By the early 
twentieth century, the conservative faction, including much of the 
elite American bar, orchestrated the canonization of Marbury and 
deification of its author, John Marshall, whose 1901 
commemoration featured several of the Pollock majority 
Supreme Court Justices.28 In lockstep, throughout the early 1900s, 
constitutional treatises, once nearly devoid of Marbury’s judicial 
review holding, began expounding Marbury’s primacy.29 As noted 
by Davidson M. Douglas, “Constitutional law treatises published 
after 1900 bore a very different quality with respect to judicial 
review and the importance of Marbury in comparison with their 
nineteenth-century predecessors. Almost without exception, the 
status of Marbury is significantly elevated. Most early twentieth-
century treatises devoted a separate section to a discussion of the 
case.”30 
By the 1920s, nearly every treatise exalted (or inflated) 
Marbury’s status, as it became the leading case for learning about 
the Court’s role in overturning unconstitutional laws.31 Indeed, in 
some Constitutional texts, Marbury made up the entire discussion 
of judicial review.32 
 
 26. See id. at 379. 
 27. Robert L. Clinton, The Strange History of Marbury v. Madison in the Supreme 
Court of the United States, 8 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 13, 18. (“When Progressive 
reformers attacked the courts in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, one of 
the focal points of that attack was Marbury.”); Id (“Supporters of the courts hailed the 
decision as having established a principle which, in its effect if not in its purpose, was as 
important a ‘charter of American liberty’ as the Declaration of Independence and the 
Constitution itself”). Notably, both sides committed a characteristic error by treating the 
dispute as if it were about the existence of judicial review rather than its proper exercise. 
See infra Part IV. 
 28. See Douglas supra note 2, at 398–401.  
 29. See id. at 404. 
 30. See id. for specific examples.  
 31. See id.  
 32. See id. (citing CHARLES E. MARTIN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF THE FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM AND OF THE IDEALS UPON WHICH IT IS BASED 
WITH ILLUSTRATIVE MATERIALS 111–13 (1928)). 
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The same pattern exists within constitutional law casebooks. 
As late as 1894, prominent casebooks’ discussions of judicial 
review either omitted Marbury or included it as simply one of 
several sources without attaching special significance to it.33 But 
beginning in the twentieth century, constitutional law casebooks 
recognized and facilitated Marbury’s ascendancy, often singling it 
out as the case on judicial review, or marking it as first among 
equals.34 Although there remained a bloc of intransigent scholars 
refusing to acquiesce to Marbury’s newfound role (and arguing 
against judicial review itself), 35 the Supreme Court itself took the 
pro-Marbury side. 
In the first decade of the twentieth century, the Court cited 
Marbury three times to justify judicial power to overrule laws — 
more than in the entire nineteenth century.36 By 1911, a 
unanimous Court was invoking Marbury as foundational: “When 
may this court, in the exercise of the judicial power, pass upon the 
constitutional validity of an act of Congress? That question has 
been settled from the early history of the court, the leading case 
on the subject being Marbury v. Madison.”37 
In 1926, Chief Justice Taft, that bitter critic of the Pollock 
decision, accepted the prevailing wisdom as to Marbury. It was a 
“great constitutional authority,” Taft pronounced, “one of the 
great landmarks in the history and construction of the 
Constitution of the United States, and … of supreme authority … 
in respect to the power and duty of the Supreme Court and other 
courts to consider and pass upon the validity of acts of Congress 
enacted in violation of the limitations of the Constitution.”38 
Taft’s embrace of Marbury marks its successful separation from 
the wreckage of Pollock: though Taft presumably still thought 
Marbury had been misused in the past, he recognized its utility for 
the future. 
There was one more snare for Marbury to avoid. Courts and 
commentators had, in effect, created Marbury (at least, the 
Marbury we know) in an effort to support aggressive Lochner-era 
 
 33. See Douglas, supra note 2, at 405. 
 34. See id.  
 35. See id. at 407.  
 36. See Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 285 (1900); Dooley v. United States, 
183 U.S. 151, 173 (1901) (Fuller. C.J., dissenting); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 
357 (1910).   
 37. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 357 (1911). 
 38. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 139 (1926). 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judicial review. That jurisprudence did not get reversed by 
constitutional amendment, as Pollock had, but it did go down to 
defeat. Yet again, Marbury survived. It was not invoked as 
frequently during the New Deal era—unsurprisingly, since the 
New Deal Court was quite deferential to the federal 
government—but the case never became a symbol of judicial 
overreach.39 Indeed, when Marbury came back, it came back 
stronger. 
Taft had called the opinion itself the supreme authority on 
judicial review. In 1958, in Cooper v. Aaron, it became associated 
with judicial supremacy: a unanimous Court described Marbury 
as “declar[ing] the basic principle that the federal judiciary is 
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution ….”40 
(One searches Marbury in vain for this proposition. It may well 
be the province of the judicial department to say what the law is, 
but that simply tells us what courts do. It does not tell us what 
effect the views of other branches of government should have on 
those judicial statements or what effect the judicial statements 
should have on the views of other branches.41) While the 
invocation of Marbury had already (somehow) begun to support 
not just the exercise of judicial review but the conclusion that a 
particular law was unconstitutional, “Cooper v. Aaron 
transformed Marbury into the modern symbol of judicial power, 
and elevated a different dimension of John Marshall’s argument 
into the standard judicial and legal rhetoric of the late twentieth 
century.”42 
After Cooper, as after Pollock, academic critiques of 
Marbury became more common. Some targeted the case’s poor 
sequencing, reasoning, and result-oriented nature, while others 
targeted its subsequent outsized influence and popular 
 
 39. From 1926 to 1958, when Cooper v. Aaron was decided, the Supreme Court cited 
Marbury’s judicial review component only five times. Id.; Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 
46, 90 (1946) (Black, J., dissenting); United States v. Commodities Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 124 
(1949); Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462, 468 (1950); Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln 
Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 464 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 40. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).  
 41. See Clinton, supra note 16, at 14 (“Careful scrutiny of the Marshall opinion … 
reveals no explicit declaration of the Court’s authority to issue ‘final’ proclamations on 
constitutional issues generally, so to ‘bind’ coordinate departments to the judicial 
declaration.”). 
 42. Keith E. Whittington & Amanda Rinderle, Making a Mountain out of a Molehill 
- Marbury and the Construction of the Constitutional Canon, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
823, 860 (2012). 
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misinterpretation – many did both.43 However, the academic 
criticism did not dent Marbury’s popularity. If anything, it fed the 
fascination. Marbury’s popularity grew, along with what Jack 
Rakove has called the “emphasis on [its] talismanic power.”44 
Cooper—likely because of its own prominence, controversy, 
and boldness—established Marbury as the Supreme Court’s go-
to citation when it felt a need to buttress its authority. In 
particular, it is Cooper that first focused on Marbury’s statement 
that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is.”45 After Cooper, the 
percentage of the Court’s citations to Marbury that refer to it for 
the power of judicial review more than doubled.46 This uptick 
created a self-reinforcing pattern: the more the Court invoked 
Marbury, the more powerful it became. Yet at the same time, it 
became increasingly devoid of content. If there is a proposition 
for which Marbury stands in this era of post-Cooper Supreme 
Court opinion writing, it seems to be little more than “we are right 
to invalidate this law.” 47 
That pattern has (largely) continued from the Warren Court 
to the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts. No matter which Court is 
invalidating a government act, no matter which constitutional 
provision is at stake, no matter the ideological valence of the 
opinion, Marbury can be invoked in support of invalidation.48 
 
 43. See, e.g., ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE 
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 1–14 (1962); CLINTON, supra note 8; William 
van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 18 DUKE L.J. 1 (1969); see generally 
Douglas, supra note 2. 
 44. See Jack N. Rakove, The Origins of Judicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts, 49 
STAN. L. REV. 1031, 1064 (1997) (“Marbury has become a story that has to be told less 
because it is really necessary to know how or where or why judicial review originated, but 
because agreement on a common point of departure makes it easier to frame and dispute 
the issues that matter today … [w]hether or not Marbury is the right point of historical 
departure does not really matter if its heuristic value is so clearly accepted.”) 
 45. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (emphasis added) (quoting Marbury, 5 
U.S. 137, 177.) The “emphatically” sentence appears to have been quoted once before, in 
the middle of a lengthy quotation from Marbury, in Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 
284–86, (1901). But Cooper is the first case to read that language as support for judicial 
supremacy. 
 46. Rinderle & Whittington supra note 5, at 836. 
 47. Id. at 838 (noting that “[t]he correlation between citations to Marbury and cases 
striking down federal laws is strong in the twentieth century”). 
 48. See, e.g., Ziglar v. Abbasi, __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017); King v. Burwell, __ 
U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013); Nat’l Fed’n 
of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012); Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2009); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); 
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Because Marbury has become both inviolable (everyone agrees it 
is a great decision) and largely empty of content (the Supreme 
Court seldom even attempts to investigate what it might mean, 
beyond “we are right to invalidate this law”), some enterprising 
Justices have even begun to deploy it against invalidation. 
Perhaps no case better reveals Marbury’s role in 
contemporary jurisprudence than U.S. v. Windsor. 49 Windsor 
invalidated the federal Defense of Marriage Act, which provided 
that the federal government would not recognize same-sex 
marriages valid under state law. In Windsor, two separate 
opinions cite Marbury. First, the Kennedy majority invokes 
Marbury for the standard purpose of judicial self-aggrandizement, 
warning that failing to decide the constitutional question 
presented would undermine Marbury’s holding that “[i]t is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to 
say what the law is.”50 Justice Scalia, in dissent, faults the majority 
for its “exalted conception of the role of [the Supreme Court] in 
America” and goes on to suggest that Marbury supports judicial 
review only in the presence of actual controversies.51 Justice 
Roberts made a similar move in King v. Burwell, arguing that 
Marbury demonstrates that the power of courts is merely to 
interpret (“to say what the law is”) rather than to make law.52 
What, then, is Marbury today? It is a canonical decision, that 
much is clear.53 It stands, almost invariably, for expansive judicial 
authority. In particular, the Supreme Court tends to use it to 
 
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); 
Bush v. Gore 531 U.S. 98 (2000); Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999); Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549 (1994); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1984); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); 
Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 
683 (1974); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Bell v. Maryland, 378 
U.S. 226 (1963). 
 49. 570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
 50. Id. at 762. 
 51. Id. at 778 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 787 (focusing on Marbury’s description of 
“[t]hose who apply the rule to particular cases”). 
 52. __ U.S. __,135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015). 
 53. “Canonical” here means something different from “great.” Marbury’s canonical 
status is demonstrated by the number of judicial decisions that treat it as a great decision 
and meaningful support for the judicial invalidation of government acts. We do not believe 
it should be treated that way, but mistaken or strategic canonization is still canonization. 
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justify invalidation of government acts—even though the 
existence of judicial review is a question quite distinct from its 
proper exercise or the correct outcome in a particular case. 
Because Marbury gets cited for a proposition (“we are right to 
invalidate this law”) about which it says nothing, it is hardly 
surprising that Justices have started trying to press it into service 
to oppose invalidation as well. 
But they don’t need to. There is already a canonical citation 
for that proposition. Judicial review has a dark side. And, we will 
see, Marbury does too. 
II. MARBURY’S SHADOW 
The existence of judicial review is now accepted; indeed, as 
we have suggested, it was accepted before Marbury. And most 
scholars (and unsurprisingly, almost all judges) now agree that 
judicial review is a good thing. But the institution is different from 
the exercise: while the institution of judicial review is good, 
particular exercises of judicial review may be good or bad. And 
while there is general agreement that courts should invalidate 
laws that violate the Constitution, there is also agreement that 
they should not invalidate laws simply because the Justices 
disagree with the policies behind them. The legal world associates 
the first type of invalidation with a heroic Supreme Court 
defending American values against majoritarian oppression and 
invokes it with a citation to Marbury. We associate the second 
type of invalidation with an activist Court imposing its will on the 
American people, and we invoke it with a citation to a different 
case: Lochner v. New York.54 Where Marbury is deployed as 
rhetorical shorthand for the argument that judicial invalidation is 
good and necessary to our system of government, Lochner is 
deployed as rhetorical shorthand for the opposite point: judicial 
invalidation is suspect, activist, and corrosive of our constitutional 
democracy. 
Lochner’s history is in many ways similar to that of Marbury. 
Understood at first as a case about the scope of state police power 
(which is what it was actually about55), Lochner was gradually 
transformed into a symbol for something different—judicial 
 
 54. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 55. See infra Part IV. 
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activism, or the imposition of judicial policy preferences under the 
guise of constitutional interpretation. 
Lochner, of course, invalidated a New York statute that 
prohibited the employment of bakeshop workers for more than 
sixty hours per week. It was not, at the time, widely reviled: it was 
a notable decision with both supporters and detractors, but there 
was little indication that it would become the anathema it is 
today.56 The dispute between the majority and the main dissent 
(written by Justice Harlan and joined by Justices White and Day) 
centered on the factual question of whether bakery employment 
was unhealthy—not a particularly dramatic question, nor one 
raising issues of appropriate judicial behavior.57 
Nor was Lochner considered especially pathbreaking or 
influential in its own time: prior to West Coast Hotel v. Parrish58 
(the case generally considered to have overruled Lochner), the 
Supreme Court cited Lochner in only eleven cases.59 For 
Lochner’s first decade, the few cases that did cite it did so in 
connection with other cases, specifically Adair and Allgeyer 
(which were both mentioned far more regularly in this period) or 
in opinions by Justice Holmes, author of the now famous dissent 
in Lochner, or both. In fact, as early as 1917 “Lochner seemed to 
be dead and buried for good,”60 with little in the way of fanfare, 
epitaph, or continuing relevance. It had a brief resurgence in the 
1920s, but with the triumph of the New Deal and the acquiescence 
 
 56. See David E. Bernstein, Lochner v. New York: A Centennial Retrospective, 83 
WASH. U.L.Q. 1469, 1500–1505 (2005) (discussing contemporaneous reaction to Lochner). 
 57. Compare Lochner, 198 U.S., at 59 (stating that “[w]e think there can be no fair 
doubt that the trade of a baker … is not an unhealthy one”) with id. at 70–71 (arguing that 
baking is unhealthy) (Harlan, J., dissenting); See Howard Gillman, De-Lochnerizing 
Lochner, 85 B.U. L. REV. 859, 860 (2005) (stating that Lochner “does not appear to be 
especially dramatic” and “did not cause much of a stir in the political system”). 
 58. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 59. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 (1932); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 
U.S. 390 (1923); Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of the District of Columbia, 261 U.S. 525 
(1923); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530 (1922); Coppage v. State of 
Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549 (1911); 
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U.S. 186 (1911); Laurel Hill Cemetery 
v. San Francisco, 216 U.S. 358 (1910); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909); Muller v. 
Oregon,  208 U.S. 412 (1908); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908). 
 60. David E. Bernstein, Lochner v. New York: A Centennial Retrospective, 83 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 1469 (2005) at 1506; See also id., at 1511–1512 (noting that Lochner “did not yet 
have the symbolic resonance that it later acquired”). 
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of the Supreme Court, Lochner’s willingness to scrutinize 
“ordinary commercial transactions” went into eclipse.61 
Lochner was rejected by 1937, but many rejected cases are 
simply forgotten: they do not live on as symbols or join the anti-
canon.62 How did Lochner acquire its anti-canonical status? The 
answer is much the same as it was for Marbury: opponents of 
aggressive judicial review needed a symbol, so they made one. 
They had some help: Justice Holmes, rather than addressing the 
case within the accepted doctrinal framework of state police 
power analysis, boldly denounced the majority as motivated by an 
enthusiasm for laissez-faire economics: “This case is decided upon 
an economic theory which a large part of the country does not 
entertain.”63 
As the Great Depression gripped the country, both 
intellectuals and the general public turned against laissez-faire 
economics, and Lochner became a convenient symbol of that. In 
addition to the Holmes dissent, there was the 1937 publication of 
Felix Frankfurter’s The Commerce Clause Under Marshall, 
Taney, and Waite. That work advanced the general progressive 
narrative that, by deciding cases based on economic preferences 
rather than law, due process jurisprudence in cases like Lochner 
had usurped the authority of the people to govern themselves. 
Frankfurter was a friend and acolyte of Holmes, and it is not 
surprising that the first explicit Supreme Court invocation of 
Lochner as a symbol of inappropriate judicial behavior is a dissent 
by Justice Frankfurter, in Winters v. New York.64 Frankfurter did 
this again, in a concurrence in American Federation of Labor v. 
American Sash & Door Co., where he characterized the Lochner 
era as one in which “economic views of confined validity were 
treated by lawyers and judges as though the Framers had 
 
 61. The phrase is from United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). 
 62. An attempt to define the constitutional anti-canon finds Lochner joined by only 
three other cases: Dred Scott v. Sanford, Plessy v. Ferguson, and Korematsu v. United 
States. See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379 (2011). 
 63. Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 64. 333 U.S. 507, 527 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Earlier, Frankfurter had 
quoted the Holmes dissent for the aphorism that general propositions do not decide 
concrete cases—part of the elevation of the Holmes dissent into the canon, but not a 
suggestion that the Lochner majority had behaved improperly. See Harris v. United States, 
331 U.S. 145, 157 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). In his Winters dissent, though, he 
deployed Lochner in its modern meaning: he accused the majority of repeating the sin of 
Lochner by “confusing economic dogmas with constitutional edicts.” 
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enshrined them in the Constitution” and invoked the Holmes 
dissent (which he now called a “famous protest”).65 
Just as conservative forces promoted Marshall and Marbury 
at the turn of the century, Frankfurter championed Justice 
Holmes and his Lochner dissent, in the process turning Lochner 
into a symbol of activism.66 Similar invocations followed: in 1952, 
for instance, a majority opinion by Justice Douglas cited Lochner 
as one of a number of cases in which the Court improperly sat “as 
a super-legislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation [or] to 
decide whether the policy which it expresses offends the public 
welfare.”67 By the early 1960s, the understanding of Lochner as 
second-guessing legislative policy decisions was well established.68 
But to make Lochner truly anti-canonical, it would take a 
high-profile and controversial case. Much as Cooper elevated 
Marbury, Griswold v. Connecticut69 raised Lochner’s profile. 
Lochner appears in three of the opinions written in Griswold. 
First, in a move that would become common, the Douglas 
majority tries to buttress its legitimacy by disavowing Lochner. 
“Overtones of some arguments suggest that Lochner v. State of 
New York, should be our guide,” Douglas announces. “But we 
decline that invitation […]. We do not sit as a super-legislature to 
determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch 
economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions.”70 
Second, in another move that would be repeated, the Black 
dissent accuses Justices White and Goldberg of adopting the 
“long-discredited” Lochner methodology and argues that if they 
had their way they “would reinstate Lochner.”71 Third, the 
Stewart dissent levies similar charges against Justices Harlan and 
 
 65. 335 U.S. 538, 543 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 66. See Howard Gillman, De-Lochnerizing Lochner, 85 B.U. L. REV. 859, 860 (2005) 
(discussing Frankfurter’s role in the creation of Lochner as a symbol of activism). 
 67. Day-Brite Lighting Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952). 
 68. See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 517 (1961) (describing Lochner era as one 
in which “the Court struck down social legislation when a particular law did not fit the 
notions of a majority of Justices as to legislation appropriate for a free enterprise system”). 
 69. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 70. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481–82 (1965). The distinction that 
Douglas draws here, interestingly, does not seem to be between faithful, mechanical 
enforcement of the Constitution and policy-driven activism but rather between “laws that 
touch economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions” and those that affect “an 
intimate relation of husband and wife”—suggesting that the Court may indeed determine 
the wisdom of such laws. Id. at 482. 
 71. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 514, 524 (Black, J., dissenting) 
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White, again invoking Lochner by name.72 The idea of “the 
Lochner era” as a period of judicial misbehavior emerged by 1970; 
in 1977, the Supreme Court used the phrase for the first time. 73 
When another high-profile Due Process case came along, 
Lochner again took center stage. In Roe v. Wade, Justice 
Blackmun began with the ritualistic denunciation of Lochner and 
then proceeded to candidly balance the competing interests to 
determine a wise solution to the abortion dilemma.74 For the 
majority, Lochner had become simply a symbol of bad judicial 
behavior, drained of any substantive content. 
Other opinions in Roe, with somewhat more justification, 
described the majority as repeating the sin of Lochner: usurping 
the authority of the legislature to make policy choices.75 Lochner 
thereafter was linked to Roe, at least in the minds of opponents of 
Roe. As John Hart Ely wrote in 1973: 
The Court continues to disavow the philosophy of Lochner. 
Yet as  Justice Stewart’s concurrence admits, it is impossible 
candidly to  regard Roe as the product of anything else. That 
alone should be  enough to damn it. Criticism of the Lochner 
philosophy has been  virtually universal and will not be 
rehearsed here. I would, however,  like to suggest briefly that 
although Lochner and Roe are twins to be  sure, they are not 
identical. While I would hesitate to argue that one  is more 
defensible than the other in terms of judicial style, there are 
 differences in that regard that suggest Roe may turn out to be 
the  more dangerous precedent. 76 
 
 72. Id. at 528 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 73. See David E. Bernstein, Lochner v. New York: A Centennial Retrospective, 83 
WASH. U. L.Q. 1469 (2005); Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (the first 
Supreme Court case to use the phrase “Lochner era”). 
 74. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117 (1973) (“We bear in mind, too, Mr. Justice 
Holmes’ admonition in his now-vindicated dissent in Lochner v. New York”); id. at 165 
(“This holding, we feel, is consistent with the relative weights of the respective interests 
involved”). 
 75. Interestingly, one of these opinions (that of Justice Stewart) is a concurrence: 
Stewart notes that he thought Lochner was dead, but since it was resurrected in Griswold 
he is willing to second-guess legislative policy choices and agrees with the Court’s 
balancing of interests. Id. at 168 (Stewart, J., concurring). The Rehnquist dissent makes 
the more standard move of accusing the Court of improperly assuming the power “to 
examine the legislative policies and pass on the wisdom of these policies.” Id. at 174. 
 76. John Hart Ely The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE 
L.J. 920, 935–46 (1973). 
2 - ROOSEVELT & KHAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/11/19  6:27 PM 
280 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 34:363 
 
Robert Bork put it more succinctly: “Who says Roe must say 
Lochner . . . .”77 
Linking Lochner and Griswold, and, similarly, linking 
Lochner and Roe, makes some obvious sense. All three are 
opinions applying the Due Process Clause. (One might, as some 
do, add in Dred Scott.78) However, as we will suggest, the 
“substantive due process” of the Lochner era was in fact quite 
different from the doctrine that emerged in the 1960s. More 
important for Lochner’s fate, though, the invocation of Lochner 
did not stop with substantive due process. After Roe, Justices 
began to invoke Lochner as a bogeyman with increasing 
regularity and in a broader range of circumstances. By 1987, Cass 
Sunstein could proclaim that “for more than a half-century, the 
most important of all defining cases has been Lochner v. New 
York.”79 
Since everyone agreed that Lochner was bad, it was available 
to everyone as a device to condemn opponents. Justices 
supportive of national power used “Lochner as an epithet” when 
disagreeing with new federalist opinions.80 On the other side, 
conservative judges invoked Lochner when decrying the 
recognition and protection of unenumerated rights.81 Almost 
everyone, as David Bernstein put it, “condemn[s] Lochner for 
improper ‘judicial activism.’”82 
 
 77. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 32 (1990). The quoted sentence 
continues “and [Dred] Scott,” which is a similar attempt to yoke Roe to an anticanonical 
case. Supporters of abortion rights viewed the matter differently, although some of them 
also found fault with Roe’s reasoning. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Foreword: Toward a 
Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1973) (viewing 
abortion as a liberty issue appropriately addressed via substantive due process and 
attempting to distinguish Lochner); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy 
and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985) (viewing abortion as 
an equality issue); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 
955 (1984); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE 
L.J. 1281 (1991); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on 
Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992). 
 78. See BORK, supra note 77.. 
 79. Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, at 873 (1987). 
 80. Bernstein, David E., Lochner v. New York: A Centennial Retrospective 83 
WASH. U. L.Q. 1469, 1523 (2005) (“Indeed, to Justices on the “left” of the Rehnquist 
Court, the majority’s decisions expanding the scope of the Eleventh Amendment and 
limiting the scope of the Commerce Clause are reminiscent of Lochner.”) 
 81. Id. 
 82. “Activism” itself tends to be an empty epithet, what one of us has called “little 
more than a rhetorically charged shorthand for decisions the speaker disagrees with.” 
KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 3 (2006). 
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This understanding has shifted a bit in the academy in recent 
decades.83 But the Supreme Court holds firm to its Lochner-as-
activism model. In Obergefell v. Hodges, the landmark case 
requiring all states to grant and recognize same-sex marriages, 
Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent cited Lochner sixteen times, 
arguing that the majority repeats its sins. (For good measure, 
Roberts also associated the majority with Dred Scott.84) What are 
those sins? “[C]onfus[ing] our own preferences with the 
requirements of the law,” Roberts explains, “unprincipled … 
judicial policymaking,” “elevat[ing] their own policy judgments to 
the status of constitutionally protected ‘liberty,’”85 “converting 
personal preferences into constitutional mandates,”86 acting on 
“naked policy preferences,”87 … you get the idea. Lochner stands 
for activism, yes, but anything a commentator dislikes can become 
activist. In the massive Obamacare decision, NFIB v. Sebelius, a 
concurrence/dissent in part criticizes other opinions (including 
that of Chief Justice Roberts) by saying that they “bear a 
disquieting resemblance to … long-overruled decisions” such as 
Lochner.88 
Marbury is universally considered good; Lochner is 
universally considered bad. (At least, this is true as a matter of 
judicial rhetoric. In the scholarly literature, there are valuable 
reappraisals of both decisions.89 But in judicial opinions, it is still 
more or less the case that Marbury means “we are right to strike 
down this law,” while Lochner means “you are wrong to strike 
down this law.”) In that sense, they could hardly be more 
different. But while they do represent opposite poles of a 
phenomenon, it is the same phenomenon. Lochner is the anti-
judicial review version of Marbury, created and anti-canonized 
 
 83. Sunstein’s article was one of the first reappraisals of Lochner, followed by the 
careful and historically informed scholarship of Barry Cushman, Howard Gillman, and G. 
Edward White, among others. See, e.g., BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL 
COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998); HOWARD 
GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA 
POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND 
THE NEW DEAL (2000). 
 84. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2617 (2015). 
 85. Id. at 2617 
 86. Id. at 2618. 
 87. Id. at 2621 
 88. 567 U.S. 519, 623 (Ginsburg, J., concurring/dissenting). 
 89. On Lochner, see sources cited supra note 83. On Marbury, see, e.g., van Alstyne, 
supra note 43; Michael Stokes Paulsen, Marbury’s Wrongness, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 343 
(2003).  
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for exactly the same reasons on the opposite side of the debate. 
Both are citations that have virtually no content: Marbury means 
that judicial invalidation is good and appropriate, Lochner that it 
is bad and inappropriate. But what determines whether a 
particular exercise of judicial review should be associated with 
Marbury or with Lochner? How can those who want to don the 
mantle of Marbury escape the taint of Lochner? 
The cases themselves, as popularly understood, offer no 
answer.90 Delving a little deeper into the cases, which we will do 
in the next Part, offers us some insight—but not an answer. What 
it does, in fact, is to show that neither Marbury nor Lochner—
neither the stylized versions invoked in judicial decisions nor the 
actual decisions as revealed and analyzed by scholars—can help 
distinguish good judicial review from bad. Lochner, from this 
perspective, is simply Marbury’s shadow: the dark version that 
follows and cannot be escaped. But the point can be made more 
strongly still. If we look closely at the cases in terms of appropriate 
judicial behavior, Marbury is actually far worse than Lochner. It 
is Marbury that should be the epithet. 
III. ESCAPING LOCHNER 
The stylized versions of Lochner and Marbury found in 
judicial opinions are not helpful guides. One tells us that 
invalidation is good, the other that invalidation is bad, but neither 
tells us how to distinguish the good from the bad. (Lochner as 
epithet suggests something bad—decisions based on policy 
preferences rather than the Constitution—but of course the other 
side will claim it is following Marbury, and invocations of Lochner 
never tell us how to detect the forbidden judicial policymaking.)  
But distinguishing good from bad exercises of judicial review is 
precisely what we need to do. 
No matter their political persuasion, legal thinkers tend to 
favor aggressive judicial review in some kinds of cases and 
deferential review in others. For instance, liberals tend to like 
judicial invalidation of abortion restrictions, laws that burden 
 
 90. The popular understanding of Lochner does tell us that judges should not decide 
cases by writing their policy preferences into law. But of course no judge has ever described 
her decision in this way. Lochner itself disavows the practice: “This is not a question of 
substituting the judgment of the court for that of the legislature. If the act be within the 
power of the state it is valid, although the judgment of the court might be totally opposed 
to the enactment of such a law.” 198 U.S. 45, 56–57 (1905). 
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racial minorities, and (some kinds of) restrictions on speech and 
religious exercise. Conservatives tend to like judicial invalidation 
of expansive federal legislation, laws that burden whites, and 
(some kinds of) restrictions on speech and free enterprise.91 
What this means is that analysis of judicial review should 
proceed at the retail, rather than the wholesale level. It is 
productive to talk about individual exercises of judicial review: 
whether the level of deference is appropriate, whether the 
decision is correct. It is much less productive to talk about judicial 
review as an institution—the institution is obviously established 
beyond the possibility of removal, and as the preceding paragraph 
noted, there is essentially no one who does not think it 
appropriate in some cases. 
So the issue really comes down to particular decisions. Can 
we approach that issue fruitfully by starting with the general 
institution of judicial review? Not if we are simply asking whether 
judicial review should exist, which is the question Marbury 
addresses. Judicial opinions that cite Marbury as support for the 
invalidation of particular government acts are engaged in non 
sequitur or misdirection. The academic obsession with the 
countermajoritarian difficulty is another example of the error of 
conflating the institution with its exercise. Alexander Bickel, who 
deserves credit (or blame) for elevating the problem to the first 
rank of academic concerns, was thinking about a particular 
decision (Brown), not the whole range of judicial review.92 But in 
that case, he should have asked how Brown could be justified in a 
democracy, not judicial review. (No answer, Bickel wrote in that 
book, is what the wrong question begets.93) Neither Brown nor 
Dred Scott, to take a quite different example, has much in 
 
 91. See, e.g., Mark A. Graber, Desperately Ducking Slavery: Dred Scott and 
Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 274 (1997). John Hart 
Ely, quoting Graber, identifies himself as a “democratic” constitutional theorist who would 
sustain both abortion restrictions and affirmative action, but Ely of course had his own 
areas where courts should be aggressive: laws that restricted the democratic process. See 
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
 92. See BICKEL, supra note 43; Sylvia Snowiss, Text and Principle in John Marshall’s 
Constitutional Law: The Cases of Marbury and McCulloch, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 973, 
1011–1012 (2000) (“Bickel was motivated immediately to find support for Brown, and, 
more generally, for the practice of judicial review”). 
 93. See BICKEL, supra note 92, at 103. John Hart Ely used this quote, juxtaposed with 
another from Bickel about the task of identifying fundamental values, as epigraph for his 
Harvard Foreword. See John Hart Ely, Foreword, On Discovering Fundamental Values, 
92 HARV. L. REV. 5 (1978). 
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common with a decision invalidating a federal statute that 
purported to eliminate Wyoming’s Senate representation. There 
is not much to say about judicial review that would be relevant to 
all of them. 
John Hart Ely did a better job. He understood that a theory 
of judicial review can be useful if it seeks to explain not whether 
judicial review should exist but when deferential review is 
appropriate and when courts should be aggressive. Armed with a 
particular justification for judicial review—protecting the 
democratic process—he went on to develop a theory about when 
courts should be willing to intervene in normal politics and when 
they should stay their hands.94 Ely found support for his approach 
in the Supreme Court’s decision in Carolene Products.95 And that 
kind of analysis, we will suggest, points a way to dissolve the 
opposition between Lochner and Marbury—ultimately, to find a 
case that has something to say about both aggressive and 
deferential judicial review.96 Identifying and analyzing that case is 
the task of Part V. Here, we set out the requirements for escaping 
Lochner and explain why Marbury fails to do so. 
What was bad about Lochner—what makes it wrong? It was 
not just the exercise of judicial review; as citations to Marbury 
indicate, judicial review has a heroic side. The problem, at least 
according to contemporary judicial opinions, was that the 
Lochner Justices based their decision on their own notions of 
good policy rather than the Constitution, that they manipulated 
the legal materials presented to them in order to produce a 
decision motivated by other factors. To fall on the Marbury side 
of judicial review, then, a decision presumably must be based on 
a faithful application of the Constitution and be motivated solely 
by an attempt to reach the legally correct answer. 
 
 94. See HART ELY, supra note 91. 
 95. See Hart Ely, supra note 93. 
 96. For Ely, Carolene Products was that case. But it is unlikely that Carolene Products 
can replace Marbury as the first case that constitutional law students encounter: it is 
neither recent enough to be ripped-from-the-headlines relevant nor old enough to be 
foundational. Moreover, the distinction that Carolene Products draws—between ordinary 
economic regulation and laws that conflict with the text of the Constitution, restrict the 
political process, or burden the interests of discrete and insular minorities, is too complex 
for an introduction to judicial review and may not be fully adequate on its own terms. See 
generally Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985). Also, 
as we suggest in Part V, Carolene Products cannot replace Marbury because Carolene 
Products embodies a Reconstruction vision of judicial review, and constitutional law 
courses generally start with the Founding Constitution. 
2 - ROOSEVELT & KHAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/11/19  6:27 PM 
2019] MCCULLOCH V. MARBURY 285 
 
It turns out, however, that under these criteria, Lochner is the 
good decision and Marbury the bad one. We consider them in that 
order. 
A. REHABILITATING LOCHNER 
There are many different ways to understand Lochner. Most 
critics, as noted above, understand it as the imposition of judicial 
policy preferences under the guise of constitutional 
interpretation. Others see it as an attempt to elevate freedom of 
contract to the status of a fundamental right, which the state can 
restrict only with an unusually persuasive justification.97 
But understanding Lochner in terms of modern fundamental 
jurisprudence—in terms of rights that are protected by some form 
of heightened scrutiny—is a mistake. What the Court was actually 
doing, recent scholarship suggests, was patrolling the boundaries 
of state legislative authority: making sure that the government 
was keeping within the boundaries of its power.98 (If you read the 
Lochner opinions—excepting the Holmes dissent—they make 
relatively clear that this is what was going on.99) 
To decide whether this is an appropriate job for judges under 
the federal constitution—an occasion to invoke the stylized 
Marbury rather than Lochner—we would need to answer three 
questions. First, is there a good argument that legislative acts 
going beyond the state’s police power violate the federal 
constitution, and in particular the due process clause? Second, are 
there limits to the police power that judges can discern? And last, 
 
 97. See, e.g., David Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373 
(2003); DAVID BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER (2011). The author’s view about 
the importance of freedom of contract then informs the normative assessment; Strauss is a 
critic of Lochner, while Bernstein finds more to like. 
 98. For this reinterpretation of Lochner, see, e.g., BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING 
THE NEW DEAL COURT  (1998); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: 
THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993); G. 
EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL (2000). Our earlier 
expositions of this argument can be found at Kermit Roosevelt III, Valid Rule Due Process 
Challenges: Bond v. United States and Erie’s Constitutional Source, 54 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 987, 990–97 (2013); Kermit Roosevelt III, Forget the Fundamentals: Fixing 
Substantive Due Process, 8 U. PA. J. CON.L. 983 (2006). 
 99. Justice Peckham explains, for instance, that the state can restrain liberty in the 
exercise of the police power—as, for instance, to protect the health of miners. The flaw he 
finds in the New York maximum hours law is not that it conflicts with a fundamental right, 
but rather that it exceeds the scope of legislative authority. “The limit of the police power 
has been reached and passed in this case.” 
2 - ROOSEVELT & KHAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/11/19  6:27 PM 
286 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 34:363 
 
do judges have sufficient advantages in discerning and enforcing 
those limits that aggressive judicial review is justified? 
On the first question, the argument is quite straightforward—
considerably more straightforward than the idea that the due 
process clause protects fundamental substantive rights, which 
John Hart Ely called an oxymoron akin to “green pastel 
redness.”100 The starting point is the premise that an act that 
exceeds the powers of the legislature is not a law. This is a point 
commonly made in our constitutional jurisprudence.101 It is, in 
fact, one of the justifications for judicial review given in 
Marbury.102 Another classic early statement—which focuses more 
on the inherent limits of legislative power and provides an account 
of those limits—is given by Justice Chase in Calder v. Bull.103 Since 
such an act is “no law,” an attempt to use it to restrain individuals, 
and a fortiori an attempt to punish them for violating it, deprives 
those individuals of liberty without due process of law.104 
 
 100. JOHN HART ELY, supra note 91, 18.. 
 101. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Louisiana, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 718, 731 (2016) (noting 
that “[an] unconstitutional law is void, and is as no law”) (quoting Ex parte Siebold, 100 
U.S. 371, 376 (1880). 
 102. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (stating that “a legislative act 
contrary to the constitution is not law”). For further discussion of the argument’s role in 
early debates over judicial review, see Larry Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term 
Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 50–52 (2001); See also Akhil Reed Amar, 
Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 664 (1996) (arguing that a statute 
authorizing unreasonable searches (in violation of the Fourth Amendment) “was null and 
void—ultra vires”). 
 103. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798) (“There are acts which the Federal, or State, 
Legislature cannot do, without exceeding their authority. . .. An ACT of the Legislature 
(for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot 
be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority.”) For a similar statement from 
the Lochner era, see Citizens’ Savings & Loan Ass’n v. City of Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 664 
(1874) (“To lay with one hand the power of government on the property of the citizen, and 
with the other to bestow it upon favored individuals to aid private enterprises and build up 
private fortunes, is none the less a robbery because it is done under the forms of law and 
is called taxation. This is not legislation.”). 
 104. Some evidence that the lines the court was patrolling were limits of state power 
rather than boundaries of federal rights comes from the fact that before the 14th 
Amendment, the Court issued some Lochner-style opinions in the exercise of its diversity 
jurisdiction. What the 14th Amendment’s Due Process Clause did, on this understanding, 
was not to set limits on state police power—those limits existed as a matter of general 
constitutional law, or what the Court sometimes called “the universal law of all free 
governments.” Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. 1, 38 (1823). Instead, it created a federal right 
enforceable through federal question jurisdiction. For a discussion of the origins and 
evolution of this jurisprudence, see Michael G. Collins, Before Lochner: Diversity 
Jurisdiction and the Development of General Constitutional Law, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1263 
(2000); Michael G. Collins, October Term, 1896—Embracing Due Process, 45 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 71 (2001). 
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As to the second question, the argument is again relatively 
straightforward. Are there judicially-identifiable limits on the 
powers that the peoples of the states delegated to their 
governments? Justice Chase’s opinion in Calder v. Bull suggests 
so. “The purposes for which men enter into society will determine 
the nature and terms of the social compact; and as they are the 
foundation of the legislative power, they will decide what are the 
proper objects of it: The nature, and ends of legislative power will 
limit the exercise of it....”105 If Calder v. Bull is not a sufficiently 
distinguished pedigree for the argument, it can be traced back 
further: this is the political theory of the Declaration of 
Independence.106 And as the twentieth century dawned, this was 
the theory that courts used to hold that redistributive legislation 
exceeded the police power.107 
The last question turns out to be the troubling one for 
Lochner. Are judges good at identifying the boundaries of the 
police power? It was generally accepted that legislatures could 
regulate to protect the public health, safety, and morals, and also 
to promote the public interest.108 Cases about the first three of 
these tended not to be especially controversial. Holden v. Hardy, 
in which the Court upheld a maximum hours law for miners, is an 
example.109 Judges might actually not be as good as legislatures at 
determining the factual question of whether some job is 
deleterious to the health, and so cases such as Holden display a 
fair degree of deference.110 
 
 105. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798). 
 106. The preamble of the Declaration asserts that people form governments to secure 
their natural rights: governments that instead invade those rights are malfunctioning 
sufficiently to justify revolution. 
 107. See generally John V. Orth, Taking From A and Giving to B: Substantive Due 
Process and the Case of the Shifting Paradigm, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 337 (1997). 
 108. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (describing police powers as 
those which “relate to the safety, health, morals, and general welfare of the public”). 
 109. 169 U.S. 366 (1898). 
 110. In Holden, the Court explicitly noted the need for deference: “a large discretion 
is necessarily vested in the legislature, to determine, not only what the interest of the public 
require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests.” 169 U.S. at 
392 (internal quotation omitted).  As Lochner put it, justly, “This court has recognized the 
existence and upheld the exercise of the police powers of the states in many cases which 
might fairly be considered as border one, and it has, in the course of its determination of 
questions regarding the asserted invalidity of such statutes, on the ground of their violation 
of the rights secured in the Federal Constitution, been guided by rules of a very liberal 
nature, the application of which has resulted, in numerous instances, in upholding the 
validity of state statutes thus assailed.” 198 U.S. at 54. The Court went on to note that it 
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Lochner does not. The majority and the dissent offer dueling 
authorities on the question of whether baking is unhealthy, but in 
the face of a conflict of experts, deference suggests that the 
legislature can take either side. The Lochner majority refused to 
defer—not so much because it believed itself better able than the 
New York legislature to assess the health impacts of baking, but 
because it suspected that there was an illegitimate purpose at 
work. “It is impossible for us to shut our eyes to the fact that many 
of the laws of this character, while passed under what is claimed 
to be the police power for the purpose of protecting the public 
health or welfare, are, in reality, passed from other motives.”111 
What was the illegitimate goal? As Justice Harlan’s dissent 
conceded, “[i]t may be that the statute had its origin, in part, in 
the belief that employers and employees in such establishments 
were not upon an equal footing . . . .”112 The Court believed that 
the New York legislature was trying to redress an imbalance in 
bargaining power. That, in the minds of the Lochner Court, was 
an impermissible purpose. A law that tried to redistribute in order 
to promote equality was “partial legislation,” akin to taking from 
one person and giving to another. That was not protecting natural 
rights but infringing on them. It was not something people would 
give their government the power to do—and so it was no law at 
all. 
We can describe Lochner-era substantive due process as 
follows. The Court was acting to keep the legislature within the 
bounds of the powers people might reasonably be thought to have 
delegated to it. In particular, it was acting to prevent unfair 
favoritism of the sort that people, behind a veil of ignorance, 
would not condone. 
So stated, the Lochner jurisprudence is not unreasonable. It 
is certainly not based on simple judicial policy preferences. 
(Lochner says this explicitly, in a passage that critics seldom quote 
or take seriously: “This is not a question of substituting the 
judgment of the court for that of the legislature. If the act be 
within the power of the state it is valid, although the judgment of 
the court might be totally opposed to the enactment of such a 
 
had sustained a Sunday closing law, which does not look like the application of modern 
heightened scrutiny. See id. at 56 (discussing Petit v. Minnesota, 177 U.S. 164 (1900)). 
 111. Id. at 64. 
 112. Id. at 69 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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law.”113) It does, however, require some other principles to be 
workable. And what happened to Lochner was that those 
necessary principles went away. 
The most basic premise Lochner required was that 
redistribution was never in the public interest. This turns out to 
be false for two reasons. First, the alternative to redistributive 
government intervention might not be continuation of the status 
quo: it might be economic collapse. In such cases, redistribution 
does not simply make one group better off at the expense of 
another (the move Lochner forbids); it makes everyone better 
when compared to the consequences of inaction.114 Second, 
through the process of repeated bargaining with shifting 
coalitions, a series of redistributive laws may in the end make 
everyone better off.115 
Perhaps more seriously, the Lochner regime also required a 
neutral baseline from which courts could determine whether the 
government was engaging in impermissible redistribution. At the 
time of Lochner itself, the common law could supply that baseline, 
with courts examining statutes for impermissible state favoritism. 
But once the common law was understood as state law—as much 
the product of state action as a statute—its status as a neutral 
baseline collapsed. 
Lochner-era jurisprudence could not survive the loss of its 
baseline and its anti-redistributive principle. Without those, it 
does indeed look like courts second-guessing legislative policy 
choices. But we should remember that some sort of policy analysis 
is involved in the decision of most constitutional questions—in 
applying the familiar tiers of scrutiny, for instance, courts must 
decide both how important some government objective is and 
how well the government act will serve that goal. Lochner, asking 
whether the statute bore a real and substantial relation to the 
protection of health, was not doing anything unusual by modern 
standards. And, perhaps more important, the Justices in the 
majority do seem to have been applying reasonable constitutional 
 
 113. 198 U.S. at 56–57. 
 114. This point comes out quite clearly in Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 
where the Court sustained a moratorium on foreclosures (seemingly a law that benefited 
homeowners at the expense of mortgage holders) on the grounds that not only “the 
concerns of individuals or of classes were involved,” but rather “the economic structure 
upon which the good of all depends.” 290 U.S. 398, 442 (1934). 
 115. See Roosevelt, supra note 10, at 992. 
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principles in good faith. The same cannot be said of John Marshall 
and Marbury. 
B. REASSESSING MARBURY 
This Part reassesses Marbury, but not by pointing out 
anything novel.116 The most amazing thing about Marbury in our 
contemporary legal culture is that its faults—well-known and 
serious—have done so little to dim its luster. Everyone knows the 
story we are about to tell—yet somehow it seems to have almost 
no impact. We are not sure why this is so, but our guess it that it 
is connected to two things: the lack of a ready substitute for 
Marbury that could do the same work of buttressing the exercise 
of judicial review, and perhaps a sneaking suspicion on the part of 
some who invoked Marbury that the decisions they were seeking 
to protect shared some its faults. We start with the story. 
Marbury, everyone knows, had its origin in the bitter election 
of 1800.117 Going in, the Federalist party held the Presidency (in 
the person of John Adams) and Congress. But they lost control of 
both branches; Thomas Jefferson won the Presidency and 
Federalist officeholders lost seats in Congress. Under the 
constitutional structure then in force, the electoral winners would 
not take office until March 4. And during the months between the 
election and the actual transfer of power, the Federalists did what 
they could to strengthen and secure their hold on the one branch 
of the federal government they would retain: the judiciary.118 With 
the Judiciary Act of 1801, the lame-duck Federalist Congress 
shrank the size of the Supreme Court to five, in the hopes of 
denying Jefferson an appointment. The Act also created 16 new 
circuit judgeships. Last, and crucial to Marbury, it created new 
justice of the peace positions for the District of Columbia. 
William Marbury was nominated to one of these positions by 
President Adams. He was confirmed by the still-Federalist Senate 
on March 3. Adams signed commissions, including Marbury’s, 
 
 116. Or not very much. A review of the Marbury literature suggests that many authors 
have not paid much attention to the argument presented by Marbury’s lawyer, Charles 
Lee, and we do discuss the light Lee’s argument sheds on the decision. 
 117. The facts of Marbury can be found in any number of places; one thoughtful 
source is Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, What are the Facts of Marbury v. Madison?, 
20 CONST. COMMENT. 255 (2003). 
 118. As Thomas Jefferson put it, the Federalists “retired into the judiciary as a 
stronghold.” 10 THE WRITINGS OF JEFFERSON 302 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert E. 
Bergh eds., 1903). 
2 - ROOSEVELT & KHAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/11/19  6:27 PM 
2019] MCCULLOCH V. MARBURY 291 
 
late into the night. John Marshall (who was still serving as Adams’ 
Secretary of State, despite having assumed the position of Chief 
Justice on February 1, 1801) affixed the great seal of the United 
States. His brother James delivered a number of the 
commissions—but not Marbury’s. 
Taking office the next day, Jefferson discovered the signed 
and sealed commissions. He instructed James Madison, his 
Secretary of State, not to deliver some of them, including 
Marbury’s. Marbury filed suit in the Supreme Court, requesting 
that the Court issue a writ of mandamus to compel the delivery of 
the commission. 
This put Chief Justice Marshall in a delicate position. If he 
issued the writ, Jefferson would likely ignore it. (He had already 
ordered Madison not to defend the suit.) Executive defiance of a 
Supreme Court order would set a troubling historical precedent, 
from which the fledgling Court might never recover. Yet 
acquiescing in Jefferson’s power play would also elevate the 
power of the Executive relative to the Court. How could he find 
a way out? 
This is the way constitutional law professors generally set the 
stage for Marbury v. Madison, to the extent that they situate it 
historically at all.119 Even this historical account is a little bit 
misleading, in that it omits the fate of the circuit judges and the 
Supreme Court. The circuit judges never took the bench; their 
offices were eliminated by the Republican Congress in the 
Judiciary Act of 1802. The Court acquiesced in that purge, so 
Marshall had already backed down on an issue of greater practical 
import than Marbury’s position as justice of the peace.120 As to the 
Court itself, the Judiciary Act of 1802 undid the Federalist 
reduction in membership and restructured the Supreme Court’s 
sessions, effectively eliminating the 1802 Term entirely. Again, 
the Court accepted these moves. 
 
 119. See, e.g., JEROME A. BARRON, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICY CASES AND MATERIALS 11–23 (8th ed. 2012) (discussing Marbury without mention 
of Stuart v. Laird); Calvin Massey, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POWERS AND 
LIBERTIES 7 (2001) (mentioning Stuart v. Laird but not disclosing its outcome); 
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 9–11 (18th ed. 
2013) (offering substantial historical context but omitting Stuart v. Laird). See generally 
Sanford Levinson, Why I Do Not Teach Marbury (Except to Eastern Europeans) and Why 
You Shouldn’t Either, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 553, 557 (2003) (discussing treatment of 
historical context in casebooks).  
 120. See Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. 299 (1803). 
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These facts complicate the context of Marbury, but perhaps 
it all simply heightens the drama. And Marshall did find a clever 
solution. Marbury had a right to the commission, Marshall 
ruled.121 Mandamus was an appropriate remedy.122 But because 
the Constitution gave the Court appellate rather than original 
jurisdiction in this case, he could not issue it.123 
And, of course, one more thing. Congress had attempted to 
give the Court original jurisdiction, Marshall wrote.124 But 
because that statute conflicted with the Constitution, it was void 
and courts were authorized, indeed required, to treat it as a 
nullity.125 
Adding in the fillip about judicial review was an especially 
nice touch. Discussing the merits allowed Marshall to rebuke 
Jefferson, which must have been satisfying but had little practical 
effect. Enunciating the doctrine of judicial review did: it 
strengthened the Supreme Court vis-à-vis the other branches of 
the federal government. And doing so in an opinion that ended 
by refusing to issue the writ of mandamus made it impossible for 
Jefferson to push back: there was no order to defy. 
So Marbury is a clever opinion in terms of finding a 
resolution to Marshall’s dilemma. But is that the proper frame of 
analysis? Chief Justice Roberts’ much-mocked description of 
judges as umpires rather than players may be simplistic and 
naïve—because judicial decisionmaking is more complicated than 
calling balls and strikes—but it captures something about judicial 
impartiality that is indeed desirable.126 Judges should try to find 
the legally correct answer to the question posed by a particular 
case. Cleverly manipulating legal materials to reach a result 
preferred for non-legal reasons is not good judicial behavior. 
It is important, then, to consider the legal soundness of 
Marbury—not the argument for judicial review, which was largely 
unnecessary and also largely derivative of Hamilton—but the 
 
 121. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 154–162 (1803). 
 122. Id. at 168–73. 
 123. Id. at 174–76. 
 124. Id. at 173. 
 125. Id. at 176–80. 
 126. See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker & Panetti v. Quarterman, Is there a “Rational 
Understanding” of the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence?, 5 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 285, 285 (2007). 
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exercise of judicial review to invalidate part of the Judiciary Act 
of 1789. 
Because these issues have been treated in detail by other 
scholars, we discuss them only briefly. Our aim, again, is not to 
disturb the received wisdom but to emphasize that most scholars 
believe that Marshall’s approach to the case was not simply that 
of an umpire seeking to determine the legally correct answer to a 
question. The question we are interested is why, given the 
dominant understanding, Marbury is considered a great case 
rather than an anti-canonical one. To set the stage for that 
analysis, though we must discuss the dominant understanding. We 
develop it by asking a simple question: what are the errors of 
Marbury? 
First, it seems relatively plain that Marshall should not have 
participated in the case at all, given his personal involvement in 
the events giving rise to Marbury’s claim.127 (Lest one think that 
these events were insignificant, the reported version of Marbury 
reveals that the Court heard testimony from various witnesses, 
including James Marshall, about the precise details of the signing 
and sealing of the commissions—that is, about what John 
Marshall himself had or had not done.128). Second (a relatively 
minor quibble), Marshall should have addressed the jurisdictional 
issue first.129 
Third, more significant, Marshall’s reading of the Judiciary 
Act of 1789 is questionable. The relevant section, section 13, reads 
as follows: 
And be it further enacted, That the Supreme Court shall have 
exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies of a civil nature, 
where a state is a party, except between a state and its citizens; 
and except also between a state and citizens of other states, or 
aliens, in which latter case it shall have original but not 
exclusive jurisdiction. And shall have exclusively all such 
jurisdiction of suits or proceedings against ambassadors, or 
other public ministers, or their domestics, or domestic servants, 
as a court of law can have or exercise consistently with the law 
of nations; and original, but not exclusive jurisdiction of all suits 
brought by ambassadors, or other public ministers, or in which 
a consul, or vice consul, shall be a party. And the trial of issues 
 
 127. See, e.g., van Alstyne, supra note 43. 
 128. 5 U.S. 137, 142–46 (1803). 
 129. See van Alstyne, supra note 89. 
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in fact in the Supreme Court, in all actions at law against 
citizens of the United States, shall be by jury. The Supreme 
Court shall also have appellate jurisdiction from the circuit 
courts and courts of the several states, in the cases herein after 
specially provided for; and shall have power to issue writs of 
prohibition to the district courts, when proceeding as courts of 
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and writs of mandamus, 
in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any 
courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the 
authority of the United States.130 
This section begins with four grants of jurisdiction—exclusive 
jurisdiction over certain suits involving states, original but not 
exclusive jurisdiction over others, exclusive jurisdiction over suits 
against certain foreign defendants, and original but not exclusive 
jurisdiction over certain other suits involving foreign defendants. 
Each of these uses the phrase “shall have … jurisdiction.” The 
next sentence discusses the trial of issues of fact. The section then 
switches back to a grant of appellate jurisdiction, then—in the 
same sentence—uses for the first time the phrase “shall have 
power.” It is this last phrase that gives the Court the power to 
issue writs of mandamus to federal officials. Is it, as Marshall 
claims, a grant of original jurisdiction over cases seeking 
mandamus against federal officials? 
That seems like quite a stretch. For one thing, the section 
seems to distinguish quite clearly between jurisdiction (the 
authority to decide a case) and the power to issue particular writs 
(the authority to grant a particular remedy). Section 14 of the Act, 
notably, goes on to give federal courts the power (again, using the 
phrase “shall have power”) to issue other kinds of writs. These 
grants of power are clearly not grants of jurisdiction, since the 
grant also includes “all other writs … which may be necessary for 
the exercise of their respective jurisdictions”—a provision which 
would be nonsensical if simply requesting a writ created 
jurisdiction. For another, the grant of power to issue writs of 
mandamus to federal officeholders is the second part of a 
 
 130. Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). Pfander points to a different version of 
Section 13, which uses a colon rather than a semicolon to connect the two parts of the last 
sentence and capitalizes the word “And.” James E. Pfander, Marbury, Original 
Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court’s Supervisory Powers, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1515, 1540 
(2001). Getting the reading of Section 13 right in some absolute sense is ancillary to our 
project—as noted, the question is not what the “real” Marbury is, but why we assess “our” 
Marbury the way we do. But we note that even this version makes the grant of power the 
second part of a sentence about appellate jurisdiction.  
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sentence that starts with a grant of appellate jurisdiction. It seems 
most natural to suppose that this second half of the sentence is a 
grant of power that can be exercised pursuant to the jurisdiction 
conferred in the first half. 131 
Marshall did not make up the idea that this section granted 
him jurisdiction over Marbury’s claim. Marbury’s lawyer, Charles 
Lee, addressed jurisdiction and mentioned section 13. But Lee’s 
main argument was that issuing a writ of mandamus to a federal 
officeholder was an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, just like 
issuing the writ to an inferior judge. Both, he claimed, involve 
“superintendence of the inferior tribunals and officers, whether 
judicial or ministerial. In this respect there is no difference 
between a judicial and a ministerial office.”132 Lee references 
Section 13 of the Judiciary Act primarily as confirming this 
understanding.133 
Supposing, however, that Congress did intend to grant the 
Court jurisdiction over suits seeking mandamus and that this 
jurisdiction counts as original rather than appellate under Article 
III, is that unconstitutional? Article III does put federal questions 
(the basis for Marbury’s suit) into the appellate category. But it 
further notes that the Court shall have appellate jurisdiction “with 
such Exceptions and under such Regulations as the Congress shall 
make.”134 Charles Lee’s argument quotes this language, 
suggesting that “Congress is not restrained from conferring 
original jurisdiction in other cases than those mentioned in the 
constitution.”135 The text is certainly not clear. 
At this point—having encountered a constitutional question 
without a clear answer—we might pause to ask what a judge’s 
stance should be. Granted that judicial review will be exercised—
a fact about which there is no dispute—should it be aggressive or 
 
 131. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 443, 445 (1989). This article sums up the § 13, and 
other arguments opposing the soundness of Marshall’s opinion.  
 132. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 146. James Pfander highlights this point, arguing that it 
supports Marshall’s interpretation of Section 13 as providing original jurisdiction 
whenever mandamus is sought against a federal official. See Pfander, supra note 130. But 
what it more naturally supports is Lee’s argument that this mandamus is in fact the exercise 
of appellate jurisdiction (which might explain its presence in a sentence that starts out 
talking about appellate jurisdiction)—not Marshall’s argument that it is an attempt to 
expand original jurisdiction. See id. at 1567–1568 (noting this argument). 
 133. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 148. 
 134. U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
 135. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 147–148. 
2 - ROOSEVELT & KHAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/11/19  6:27 PM 
296 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 34:363 
 
deferential? Here we might consider various factors.136 How much 
do we trust Congress? Are the members of Congress who enacted 
this bill pure and intelligent? Did they debate its provisions and 
consider constitutional objections? How well do we think they 
understood Article II? Is the power that Congress claims here 
susceptible to misuse? If it is, can we trust Congress to exercise it 
wisely and not abuse it? What harms will follow if the Court 
wrongly invalidates a permissible regulation of jurisdiction—and, 
on the other side, what harms follow if it wrongly allows an 
impermissible one to stand? 
We do not purport to claim that these are all of the questions 
relevant to deference, nor do we claim to have an answer to even 
the questions raised here.137 What we do claim is that when a 
constitutional question is not clear, the most important thing the 
Court must do is decide what degree of deference is owed the 
judgment of the other relevant government actors—the 
legislature that enacted a bill, the President who signed it into law. 
Which factors go into that decision is a question about which 
reasonable people can disagree. How the factors should be 
balanced against each other when they point in different 
directions is another such question. What we argue here is simply 
that those questions must be considered. Most of the tests that the 
Court has created over the years—and in particular the tiers of 
scrutiny—are best understood as based fundamentally on the 
decision to defer (rational basis) or to be aggressive (heightened 
scrutiny).138 
Marbury does not consider these questions. Marbury makes 
no attempt at all to decide whether deference is appropriate. 
Instead, having manufactured a conflict,139 Marshall resolves it in 
a brisk and superficial fashion: if the Constitution calls some cases 
 
 136. See generally Roosevelt, supra note 10, at 22–36 (discussing factors relevant to 
decision about deference); See also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 401–402 (1819) 
(same). 
 137. For those that do have answers, we suggest that most would support judicial 
deference. The First Congress presumably understood Article III quite well, since several 
Members of Congress had participated in the drafting. And allowing Congress to take a 
case from the appellate category and make it original does not seem an outcome that 
threatens the rights or well-being of individuals, or the structure of our government, or the 
ability of the Court to perform its function in that system.  
 138. See ROOSEVELT, supra note 10.  
 139. See Pfander, supra note 130, at 1517 (noting that “[u]nder the dominant narrative, 
Marshall has been said to have manufactured the conflict between section 13 and Article 
III”). 
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original and others appellate, Congress can’t change that. Why 
not? Because allowing Congress to move cases between the two 
categories renders the constitutional division “mere 
surplusage.”140 But that is clearly not true: Article III might set out 
an irreducible core of original jurisdiction to which Congress can 
add but not subtract, or a default rule might be provided simply 
for convenience.141 In any event, this element of Marbury is not 
even an accurate statement of current law. While the Court has 
adhered to the idea that Congress may not grant original 
jurisdiction in cases where Article III confers appellate 
jurisdiction, it has allowed Congress to grant appellate jurisdiction 
over cases that Article III puts in the original category.142 
What we have just given is the commonly accepted version of 
Marbury. Given that, how should the case be evaluated? Most 
commentators find a lot to praise. The opinion is a “political 
masterstroke,”143 a “masterwork of indirection,”144 a “virtuoso 
performance.”145 The Supreme Court, of course, regularly cites 
Marbury as justification for its invalidation of state and federal 
laws, and Justice Breyer, in a recent book, called the opinion 
“brilliant,” a “judicial tour de force,” and “worthy of the Great 
Houdini.”146 
This is high praise. Still, with the presumable exception of 
Supreme Court citations, it often sounds more like aesthetic 
judgment than endorsement of legal reasoning or judicial 
behavior. R. Kent Newmyer offers one of the most extreme 
examples, writing that “[l]ike a great work of art, Marbury yields 
different meanings to different viewers at different times—which 
 
 140. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 147–48, 174–75 (1803). 
 141. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Marbury’s Wrongness, 20 CONST. COMM. 343, 
355 (2003); Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 443, 445 (1989) (stating that since “alternative readings 
would leave the words of Article III with some ‘operation,’ it seems fair to criticize the 
Marbury Court for overstating the logical force of its preferred reading”).  
 142. See Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449 (1884). 
 143. HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 69 
(1953).  
 144. ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 40 (1960). 
 145. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Marbury, Marshall, and the Politics of Constitutional 
Judgment, 89 VA. L. REV. 1203, 1204 (2003).  
 146. STEPHEN G. BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK 12, 16 (2010). See also, 
e.g., Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Essay: Philemon, Marbury, and the Passive-Aggressive Assertion of 
Legal Authority, 29 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 241, 241–242 (2014) (“a brilliant legal and political 
tour de force”). 
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may be the true mark of greatness.”147 There’s a lot of truth there 
as far as what makes a work of art great, but it begs the question 
of whether judicial opinions should be judged by the same criteria. 
And more urgently, it does not explain why one of Marbury’s 
meanings—in fact, the dominant one we have described—is that 
this is how good judges behave. 
That Marbury is considered good judicial behavior, 
especially but not exclusively by the Supreme Court, is relatively 
clear. The Court would hardly turn to an example of judicial 
misbehavior (like the conventional understanding of Lochner) to 
support its authority in controversial cases. And scholars do seem 
generally to share this view. Louise Weinberg, for instance, 
pronounces that “[i]n Marbury, a great father of our country 
bequeathed to us his greatest legacy and our most precious 
inheritance—the inestimable treasure of an enforceable 
Constitution.”148 
But what is it that these commentators are praising? 
Marbury, as we have described it, and as it is commonly 
understood, is a decision that creatively manipulates legal 
materials to reach a decision deemed desirable for extra-legal 
reasons. On the conventional account, then, Marbury is activist in 
just the way Lochner is supposed to be: it seeks to strengthen the 
judiciary because that is considered good policy. One might 
defend Marbury by pointing out that the policy it advances 
(judicial power) is a desirable and accepted constitutional value 
while the one Lochner advances (laissez-faire economics, on the 
crude account, or a ban on redistribution for its own sake, on the 
more sophisticated one) is not. Viewed this way, both decisions 
are examples of what Jack Balkin and Sandy Levinson have called 
“high politics,” with the difference that Marbury’s preferred value 
has stood the test of time.149 
But Marbury is not only, or even primarily, high politics. 
Marshall’s reasons are not just a desire to strengthen the federal 
judiciary (something that may strike most federal judges as 
 
 147. R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME 
COURT (2001). 
 148. Louise Weinberg, Our Marbury, 89 VA. L. REV. 1235, 1412 (2003). 
 149. See Sanford Levinson, Why I Still Won’t Teach Marbury (Except in a Seminar), 6 
U.PA. J. CON. L. 588, 599 (2004); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the 
Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1062–63 (2001). 
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anodyne150); they also include a desire to advance the fortunes of 
a particular political party: the Federalists. By favoring the 
judicial branch because it is controlled by the Federalists, 
Marbury is partisan to a degree that has almost never been 
replicated by the Supreme Court.151 
Supporting the attempt of a defeated political party to 
rearrange the playing field for future battles, resisting the peaceful 
transfer of power that democratic elections are supposed to 
produce … these are bad things. (After the election of 2018, 
defeated parties in states including Wisconsin and North Carolina 
attempted to alter the powers of state government to reduce the 
impact of their loss. These efforts were widely condemned.152) 
Amazingly, it gets even worse. Susan Low Bloch recounts the 
details of Marbury and goes on to suggest that perhaps the whole 
thing was a collusive suit: perhaps Marshall had a plan, and 
Marbury was in on it.153 “[I]t is at least possible,” she argues, that 
Marshall “knowingly withheld the delivery of some commissions 
to set the stage for this profoundly important case” and that 
“Marbury and his colleagues knowingly chose to sue in the 
Supreme Court” because Marshall “might have foreseen that he 
could use the case in the manner he eventually did and might have 
let it be known that suing in the Supreme Court was the preferred 
course.” This is an astonishing chronicle of judicial misbehavior. 
 
 150. But see Paulsen, supra note 89, at 356 (stating that “[i]t is flat-out wrong to 
knowingly misuse judicial authority in a specific case in order to advance judicial power 
generally”). 
 151. The Supreme Court often reaches results that align with the preferences of one 
or another political party and often the Justices voting in those cases vote to promote the 
preferences of the party of their appointing President. But there are plausible innocent 
explanations for this—political parties have constitutional visions and appoint Justices who 
share them. See generally Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law 
and Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 1407, 1408–09 (2001). The Justices very seldom seem to be 
seeking to promote the power of a party for its own sake. The most notable exceptions are 
perhaps decisions about voting rights and regulations, which have a clear partisan effect, 
and of course the resolution of the 2000 presidential election. See Shelby County v. Holder, 
570 U.S. 529 (2013); Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 553 U.S. 1818 (2008); Bush 
v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 152. See, e.g., James Hohmann, The Daily 202: Lame-duck power grab in Wisconsin 




 153. See Susan Low Bloch, The Marbury Mystery: Why did William Marbury Sue in 
the Supreme Court?, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 607, 625–27 (2001). 
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But what conclusion does Bloch draw? That Marshall in Marbury 
pulled off “a remarkable feat for which we are all in his debt.”154 
The suggestion that Marbury was a collusive suit may or may 
not be true. Even without that, we know enough to know that, in 
the words of Michael Stokes Paulsen, Marbury is “rotten to the 
core.”155 The question that remains is the one he raises: “How 
could we possibly celebrate such a despicable opinion as the 
cornerstone of American constitutional law?!”156 
There are some answers. We have tried above to describe 
how (and when) Marbury rose to prominence. Around the turn 
of the 20th century (happily coincident with Marbury’s 
centennial), advocates of aggressive judicial review needed a 
symbol and made one. And perhaps they needed one as 
contentless and political as Marbury is: what they were trying to 
support, remember, was the era of judicial review now reviled as 
activism, the Lochner era. The harder question is how Marbury 
survived the death of Lochner. The answer there, we have 
suggested, is that it managed to latch on to Warren Court cases 
that law professors like. And again, the content-free nature of 
Marbury made it easy to use: Marbury can be deployed in support 
of any invalidating decision.157 
 
 154. Id. at 627. 
 155. Paulsen, supra note 89, at 357. 
 156. Id. Paulsen’s answer to this question is to back off from the analysis that suggests 
Marshall deliberately manufactured a conflict between the Judiciary Act and Article III: 
“I would prefer to believe, perhaps against the evidence, that John Marshall simply 
announced in good faith a lot of legal propositions that I … think are mistaken.” Id. at 357. 
Agreeing with Paulsen’s assessment of the evidence, we have less difficulty believing the 
strategic narrative. In any case, the dominant narrative presents Marbury as a carefully 
crafted strategic decision, so, for the purposes of evaluating its place in the constitutional 
canon, we evaluate it as such. 
 157. If one is trying to support Supreme Court decisions that one thinks are not 
actually simply attempts to reach the legally correct outcome, then Marbury has obvious 
appeal. As long as judges are doing what you want, the judge who skillfully manipulates 
legal materials to produce justice despite the law is a heroic figure. It seems likely that 
some law professors viewed the Warren Court this way. See LAURA KALMAN, THE 
STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 6 (1996); Barry Friedman, The Birth of An 
Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 
YALE L. J. 153, 237–54 (2002). Herbert Wechsler, for instance, notoriously stated that 
although he approved of Brown on policy grounds, he could not justify it as constitutional 
law. See Friedman at 251. The problem for such professors came when judges started 
manipulating the materials to reach ends they did not like: having used Marbury to support 
activism on the left, they had no remaining ground from which to criticize the activism of 
the right. 
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But the Warren Court is over. Law professors, being 
generally liberal, are no longer so enthusiastic about the 
aggressive judicial review practiced by the Rehnquist and Roberts 
Courts. Why does Marbury persist? 
One answer is that there is always a constituency for 
aggressive judicial review. More recently, conservatives have 
embraced Marbury. Liberals have a hard time rejecting it because 
it is still associated with civil rights cases. And although everyone 
seems to understand the problematic features of the actual 
decision, rejecting Marbury as symbol is hard. Marbury has no 
explanation of when aggressive judicial review is good and when 
it is bad; indeed, it seems entirely unaware of the question. Hence, 
there is nothing in the opinion to attack, except judicial review in 
general. Making arguments about why Marbury does not support 
invalidation in a particular case is like having a fistfight with fog. 
This is perhaps the greatest problem, that Marbury and 
Lochner seem to have set the terms for debates about the exercise 
of judicial review. The two sides hurl empty slogans at each other, 
alternating their invocations of the two meaningless cases as 
expediency demands.158 And there is no way to make progress, 
because we have no replacement. There is no case explaining 
when aggressive judicial review is appropriate and when the 
Court should defer. Or at least no early case. Or at least no case 
with an opinion by the great John Marshall. 
Except there is. 
IV. REPLACING MARBURY 
Can we dislodge Marbury? Remove it from the rhetoric of 
the Supreme Court, as a symbol of the propriety of aggressive 
judicial review and judicial supremacy in constitutional 
interpretation? Remove it from the first-year constitutional law 
course, as an introduction to judicial review? Some scholars doubt 
it. “Marbury v. Madison is so firmly enshrined as the dramatic 
 
 158. The list of cases in which one side invokes Marbury while the other invokes 
Lochner is substantial. Notable such decisions include NFIB v. Sibelius, 567 U.S. 519 
(2012); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010); Kelo v. City of New London, 
545 U.S. 469 (2005); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Bd., 527 
U.S. 666 (1999); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 
702 (1997); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); and 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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founding moment of the doctrine of judicial review,” writes Jack 
Ralove, “that it is difficult to imagine how it could ever be 
displaced.”159 
But times change. Marbury as the avatar of judicial review 
came from nowhere; we can hope it will return there.160 Honestly 
confronting its flaws is one step in that direction. But Marbury 
exists as a symbol not because it is misunderstood but because 
some symbol is needed. People will always want a case that stands 
for the idea that aggressive judicial review is appropriate. 
Still, unless they are acting in bad faith, they might want a 
case that actually says something about that idea. And as we noted 
in the introduction, such a case exists. An early case, a Marshall 
opinion, a case regularly and approvingly cited by the Supreme 
Court: McCulloch v. Maryland. 
McCulloch arises out of another political struggle, the fight 
over the Bank of the United States. After considerable debate 
about whether Congress had the power to charter a national bank, 
the First Bank of the United States was incorporated in 1791. 
Without sufficient political support to renew it, its charter expired 
in 1811. The War of 1812, however, demonstrated the need for a 
national bank, and the Second Bank of the United States was 
incorporated in 1816. 
Political opposition remained, and some states, including 
Maryland, imposed taxes on the Second Bank in an attempt to 
destroy it.161 James McCulloch, the cashier of the Baltimore 
branch of the Second Bank, refused to pay the tax. The state of 
Maryland sued him in its own courts and, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
prevailed. McCulloch then took the case to the United States 
Supreme Court. 
John Marshall confronted two questions, conventionally 
called McCulloch I and McCulloch II. First, did Congress have the 
 
 159. Jack N. Rakove, The Origins of Judicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts, 49 
STAN. L. REV. 1031, 1036 (1997).  
 160. There are some law professors who do not teach Marbury. See Levinson, supra 
note 119, at 557. And Levinson’s casebook presents McCulloch as its first case, moving to 
Marbury only in the context of political struggles in the early Republic. See PAUL BREST, 
ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING (7th ed. 2018). 
 161. Evidence that destruction was Maryland’s goal can be found in the nature of the 
tax, which was large and discriminatory, worded to apply only to the Bank of the United 
States. Additionally, in McCulloch, Maryland argued that the Bank was unconstitutional—
an argument that would not help it collect the tax but would, if it succeeded, destroy the 
Bank. 
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power to create the bank? Second, did Maryland have the power 
to tax it? 
Neither of these questions had a clear answer based on the 
words of the Constitution. The power to charter a bank, or to 
create corporations generally, was not specifically enumerated in 
Article I, Section 8. But perhaps, as Hamilton had argued, the 
creation of a bank was an appropriate means to one or more of 
the ends enumerated in Section 8. As for Maryland’s tax, states 
certainly did have the power to tax corporations operating within 
their borders. But the structure of our federal system might 
impose limits on what states could do to instrumentalities of the 
federal government. 
McCulloch is considered a great case, and it is a staple of 
constitutional law casebooks. 162 But it is generally understood to 
stand primarily for the idea that the federal government has broad 
powers.163 It is not generally considered an important case about 
the exercise of judicial review. And those who do focus on its 
discussion of judicial review tend to read it primarily for the 
proposition that the Constitution is to be interpreted in a flexible 
manner.164 
But that reading misunderstands McCulloch. Marshall does 
not suggest that the Constitution should always be interpreted in 
a particular way. “[I]t is a Constitution we are expounding” means 
that text alone will often not supply an answer. But that is just to 
say that many constitutional questions will not be clear—and the 
consequence of that, as we have argued earlier, is that the Court 
 
 162. See David S. Schwartz, Misreading McCulloch v. Maryland, 18 U. PA. J. CON. L. 
1, 8 (2015) (“McCulloch is presented as a ‘principal case’ in every current constitutional 
law casebook…”). 
 163. See generally id., at 8–13 (describing conventional view of McCulloch as 
“aggressive nationalism”).  
 164. Ian Bartrum, for example, pairs Marbury and Lochner as two sides of judicial 
review. He then considers McCulloch as an illustration of flexibility in interpretation. The 
next section of his article returns to the topic of judicial review; it is about representation 
and democracy. But rather than McCulloch, it goes directly to Brown and John Hart Ely. 
See Ian Bartrum, Constitutional Value Judgments and Interpretive Theory Choice, 40 FLA. 
ST. L. REV. 259 273–77 (2013). Sylvia Snowiss goes even further, arguing that Marbury is 
an example of principled judicial review and McCulloch is something more like judicial 
lawmaking. See Sylvia Snowiss, Text and Principle in John Marshall’s Constitutional Law: 
The Cases of Marbury and McCulloch, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 973 (2000); Stephen B. 
Presser, Marbury, McCulloch, Gore and Bush: A Comment on Sylvia Snowiss, 33 J. MAR. 
L. REV. 1157, 1159 (2000). 
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must then decide whether or not to defer to the views of the 
government actor whose conduct it is reviewing. 
The genius of McCulloch—what makes it the perfect case to 
start a constitutional law course—is that it addresses this issue. It 
addresses it in the context of two different questions (McCulloch 
I and McCulloch II), and it offers a plausible explanation of why 
deference is appropriate in one, but not the other. 
As to the power of Congress to create a bank, Marshall 
makes several observations about deference. Congress debated 
the issue, he points out; its Members were pure and intelligent. 
(They were, of course, the same people who drafted the Judiciary 
Act of 1791, a factor given not even a mention in Marbury.) Those 
considerations are reasonable—in deciding whether to defer to 
what Jefferson called “the wisdom of the legislature” one might 
want to know whether the wisdom exists and has been 
employed—but they have not ended up playing a significant role 
in Supreme Court decisionmaking.165 He also offers two other 
considerations, however, which have. 
First, Marshall observes that the question of whether 
Congress can create a bank is one “in the decision of which the 
great principles of liberty are not concerned, but the respective 
powers of those who are equally the representatives of the people 
are to be adjusted. . . .”166 This is a distinction between cases about 
individual rights (the great principles of liberty) and federalism 
cases (those that determine whether a particular power belongs to 
the states or the federal government, who are equally the 
representatives of the people), with the implication being that 
courts should be more deferential on issues relating to federalism. 
Marshall does not explain why he believes that more 
aggressive review is justified in individual rights cases, but it is not 
difficult to construct arguments in support of this principle. 
Consideration of the costs of error gives one: if the Court 
mistakenly allows Congress to use a power that should have been 
left to the states, it is not clear that any individual is worse off. 
There is some departure from our scheme of dual sovereignty, but 
that injury may not be severe if Congress can be trusted not to use 
 
 165. They have played some role. In the wake of United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 
(1995), some scholars suggested that the Court should examine the process of 
congressional lawmaking, and in other federalism cases the Court has observed that the 
presence of relevant congressional findings may provide support for a law. 
 166. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 401 (1819). 
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its powers to regulate matters the states can handle on their own. 
(And at this point the first argument blends into the second one, 
discussed below.) If, on the other hand, the Court mistakenly 
allows the government to abridge some individual right, the cost 
is obvious: it is the violation of that right. 
Second, Marshall considers the extent to which Congress 
may be trusted not to abuse its power. (The point is made 
explicitly in McCulloch II, but the idea informs the discussion of 
deference in McCulloch I.) “In the legislature of the Union 
alone,” he observes, “all are represented. The legislature of the 
Union alone, therefore, can be trusted by the people with the 
power of controlling measures which concern all, in the 
confidence that it will not be abused.”167 Because the states are 
represented in Congress, that is—because Senators are selected 
by state legislatures168—Congress may be trusted to observe the 
appropriate lines between state and federal authority. 
That is an argument for deference. McCulloch II presents the 
opposite side of the coin, particularly the representation 
argument. Counsel for Maryland argued that just as Congress 
could be trusted with expansive powers, so could the state. But 
there is an obvious difference, answered Marshall: “that which 
always exists, and must always exist, between the action of a whole 
on a part, and the action of a part on the whole… .”169 Because 
Maryland will receive all the benefits of a tax imposed on the 
Bank of the United States, while most of the burden will fall on 
out-of-staters with no voice in the Maryland legislature, Maryland 
has obviously distorted incentives. 
That is an argument for aggressive judicial review, based on 
what we could call defects in democracy. The Maryland 
legislature may well have superior institutional competence in 
deciding what level of taxation is appropriate given the services 
the state provides to the Bank. But there is every reason to think 
that it will not, in fact, do its best to identify a reasonable level and 
will instead tax too highly. 
So McCulloch offers us a perfect example of how to exercise 
judicial review: one issue on which deference is appropriate, and 
 
 167. Id. at 431; see also id. at 435 (noting that “[t]he people of all the States, and the 
States themselves, are represented in Congress”). 
 168. See U.S. CONST. art. I. This process has, of course, been altered by the 17th 
Amendment. 
 169. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 435–436. 
2 - ROOSEVELT & KHAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/11/19  6:27 PM 
306 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 34:363 
 
one issue on which it is not. But did McCulloch’s model of judicial 
review fade away? In particular, if like many (though not all) 
modern judges and law professors we would like to justify a large 
part of the Warren Court jurisprudence but not revive Lochner, 
does McCulloch offer anything? 
Of course it does. Far more than Marbury—which has no 
theory about when aggressive review is good or bad and was, 
remember, first canonized precisely to defend Lochner—
McCulloch tells us what the difference is. Lochner now looks to 
us like judicial second-guessing the wisdom of legislative policy 
choices. That is unjustified on the McCulloch theory: very bad 
policies may well be unconstitutional (most of the doctrinal tests 
implementing the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses 
actually have elements of policy assessment in them170), but 
legislatures are better at making those choices and there is no 
reason, with ordinary economic regulation, to suppose they will 
not use their superior competence.171 
And what about the Warren Court? John Hart Ely famously 
argued that most of the controversial Warren Court decisions 
could actually be understood as responses to what we have called 
defects in democracy: circumstances in which the benefits of a law 
flow to a politically powerful group and the burdens fall on a 
weaker one. Most of the decisions, he said, could be justified 
under the theory of Carolene Products footnote four. 
But where does Carolene Products get its theory? From 
McCulloch! Carolene Products explicitly cites McCulloch (more 
precisely, McCulloch II) as a case supporting its suggestion of 
 
 170. Courts must decide, for instance, how important the government’s asserted goal 
is: legitimate, important, or compelling? They must also decide how closely tied to that 
goal the chosen means is: rationally, substantially, or necessarily. 
 171. That said, you could actually make a pro-aggressive judicial review argument 
from McCulloch. Cases about economic regulation are individual rights cases, so they 
involve the great principles of liberty. And if economic regulations are pretextual—if they 
are not good faith attempts to advance the public interest but rather seek some 
impermissible motive—the pretext passage of McCulloch seems to authorize invalidation. 
See 17 U.S. at 423. This argument does not tell us what is an impermissible motive—
Lochner’s anti-redistribution principle is no longer available—and it does not tell judges 
not to defer. But it may illustrate that McCulloch, too, can contain different meanings for 
different audiences. One could even argue that the 17th Amendment changes the calculus 
for review of the limits of federal power: now that state legislatures no longer select 
Senators, the Senate is much less of a check on unnecessary federal legislation. 
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heightened scrutiny for laws that burden the interests of discrete 
and insular minorities.172 
The point bears emphasis. Carolene Products marks the 
Court’s abandonment of Lochner and its renunciation of the idea 
that judges can second-guess legislative determinations about 
what the public interest requires. But in footnote four, it suggests 
that some exercises of aggressive judicial review can still be 
justified. And for that principle it does not cite Marbury—wisely 
so, since Marbury says nothing about that question and had 
recently been used to support Lochner. It cites McCulloch II, 
which gives exactly the theory that is required.173 
McCulloch, it turns out, does what the Court and 
commentators used Marbury for in the civil rights era. It supports 
the Warren Court, both particular decisions such as Brown and 
and the general jurisprudential stance: deference with respect to 
the limits of federal power, greater suspicion with respect to 
individual rights, and less deference to state legislatures. And 
unlike Marbury, it does so with coherent argument rather than 
slogan and convenient elision; unlike Marbury, it cannot be 
invoked to support any act of judicial invalidation. And unlike 
Lochner, it offers firm ground to criticize a court that fails to defer 
when it should. There is thus a particular irony that in turning to 
Marbury instead of McCulloch, defenders of Warren Court 
jurisprudence elevated a bad model of judicial review (partisan 
activism) rather than a good one (differential deference). 
Do you want to criticize New Federalism decisions like 
Lopez or Shelby County?174 Don’t say they’re like Lochner; say 
that this is McCulloch I. Do you want to support Warren Court 
decisions like Brown, or more modern ones like Obergefell? 
Don’t say they’re like Marbury; say that they are McCulloch II. 
 
 172. See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4. (1938). 
 173. There is an important difference between McCulloch and Carolene Products, of 
course. McCulloch was concerned that states would not give due weight to the interests of 
out-of-staters, a concern that existed at the Founding and is reflected in various provisions 
of the original Constitution, most notably though not exclusively Article IV. Carolene 
Products raises the concern that states will not give due weight to the interests of politically 
weak groups within the state. That concern is largely absent from the Founding; it emerges 
in the aftermath of the Civil War and enters the Constitution with the Reconstruction 
Amendments. Carolene Products, really, is the Reconstruction version of McCulloch. 
 174. In Lopez, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion invoked Marbury, see 514 
U.S. at 566, while Justice Souter’s dissent responded with Lochner, id. at 605 (Souter, J., 
dissenting). 
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Do you want to claim supremacy for the judiciary? McCulloch 
actually has a powerful statement to that effect—unlike Marbury, 
which really offers only the word “emphatically.” Of 
constitutional questions, McCulloch says this “by this tribunal 
alone can the decision be made. On the supreme court of the 
United States has the constitution of our country devolved this 
important duty.”175 
McCulloch does everything that judges can appropriately ask 
Marbury to do, and does it much better.176 It does not have the 
historical stain of being invoked in support of Lochner and Dred 
Scott.177 And it is not an undertheorized, disingenuous, rankly 
partisan example of judicial misbehavior. It is an example of how 
judicial review should be done. McCulloch, not Marbury, is what 
the Court should appeal to if it wants to justify the exercise of 
judicial review. 
What about law professors? Perhaps the worst thing about 
starting a constitutional law course with Marbury is that it 
promotes a certain vision of the judicial role—not judicial 
supremacy so much as judicial exclusivity.178 In Marbury, 
 
 175. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 401 (1819). 
 176. McCulloch does not, of course, support aggressive judicial review in cases where 
there is no plausible argument that aggressive review is appropriate. But that is perhaps 
the best reason to prefer it to Marbury. 
 177. See Snowiss, supra note 92, at 1007 (noting that when Dred Scott was attacked, 
“[d]efense of judicial review drew on Marbury”). By contrast, in Dred Scott itself, 
McCulloch is used by Justice McClean’s dissenting opinion to criticize the majority. See 60 
U.S. 393, 542 (1857) (McClean, J., dissenting). 
 178. We have said that we do not think Marbury in fact contains a statement of judicial 
supremacy. Others agree. See, e.g., Eric Segall, Why I Still Teach Marbury (and So Should 
You): A Response to Professor Levinson, 6 U. PA. J. CON. L. 573, 583 (2004). But judicial 
supremacy is not quite our concern. Judicial supremacy is generally taken to be the idea 
that the Supreme Court has the last word on the meaning of the Constitution. Accepting 
that for present purposes, there are still two important questions to be considered. First, 
what is the significance of the fact that some other governmental actor believes that what 
it is doing is consistent with that meaning? (The Supreme Court interprets the Equal 
Protection Clause to prohibit laws that stigmatize a disfavored group, for instance: how 
much does it matter that a legislature believes its law is not stigmatizing? More or less than 
it matters that Congress believes an activity in the aggregate substantially affects interstate 
commerce?) Second, to what extent are other government actors bound to follow not just 
the meaning of the Constitution as the Supreme Court has interpreted it, but the doctrine 
the Court has created to implement that meaning. (The Supreme Court uses rational basis 
review to assess state discrimination on the basis of age, for instance: can Congress decide 
that some state law stigmatizes the elderly and is therefore unconstitutional even if the 
Court would uphold it?). See generally Roosevelt, supra note 10 (distinguishing between 
doctrine and meaning). Both these questions involve constitutional decisionmaking 
outside the courts, but neither presents the question of judicial supremacy in its 
conventional form.  
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constitutional analysis seems to take place only within the Court. 
There is no suggestion that anyone else might have thought about 
the possible conflict between the Judiciary Act and Article III. 
That is part and parcel of Marbury’s neglect of the question of 
deference: if judges are the only ones who think about the 
Constitution, of course their views are the only ones that matter. 
We do not know what, if anything, the drafters of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 said about the constitutional question 
Marshall found in Marbury. But we do know what Congress and 
other governmental actors said about the question in McCulloch 
I. James Madison gave a speech to the House of Representatives 
in which he argued against the constitutionality of the First 
Bank—clear evidence that Congress took seriously its obligation 
to consider the constitutionality of its bills.179 When, despite 
Madison’s arguments, Congress passed the bill, President 
Washington asked his cabinet for opinions about its 
constitutionality—evidence, similarly, that the President has an 
obligation to consider constitutionality of legislation before 
signing.180 Most of those opinions analyzed the issue on a blank 
slate, as if it were being considered for the first time. But Thomas 
Jefferson, interestingly, also discussed the significance of the fact 
that two houses of Congress had voted for the bill. Unless a bill is 
clearly unconstitutional, he advised Washington, “a just respect 
for the wisdom of the legislature would naturally decide the 
balance in favor of their opinion.” That is a prescription for 
deference—but not always. The veto, Jefferson continues, is for 
cases where Congress is “clearly misled by error, ambition, or 
interest…”181 
Here, as in McCulloch, are the beginnings of a theory about 
when deference to legislative judgment is or is not appropriate. 
And because deference plays a role in the President’s decision, we 
can see the emergence of the gap between the limits the 
Constitution imposes and the limits particular actors will 
enforce—we can see that the President might not veto a bill he 
believes is unconstitutional, or one that is in fact unconstitutional. 
We can see the emergence of the distinction between doctrine and 
 
 179. See BREST, ET AL., supra note 160, at 29. 
 180. See id. at 32–37. 
 181. Id. at 34. 
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meaning, or operative propositions and decision rules,182 which is 
(in our view) essential to understanding the role of the Supreme 
Court in relation to other government actors.183 
Would it be effective to present McCulloch this way, not 
simply as a case but as what you could call a case study, 
demonstrating how different government actors interpret the 
Constitution both independently and in relation to each other? 
Would it help students to start their analysis of judicial review 
with a case that exercises that power in a sophisticated and 
institutionally thoughtful way, rather than one that relies on 
superficial sloganeering? 
We think so. And it has been done: what we have just 
described is the approach taken by Sandy Levinson’s casebook, 
used by one of us for fifteen years. Levinson, of course, has vowed 
not to teach Marbury again. While his coauthors might not go so 
far, they do presumably agree with the use of McCulloch to 
demonstrate how constitutional interpretation is or should be 
done. That adds Paul Brest, Jack Balkin, Akhil Amar, and Reva 
Siegel to the list of professors who think that Marbury can, at 
least, lose its spot as the first case assigned in Constitutional Law. 
Should Marbury remain in the canon at all? As judicial 
rhetoric in support of the invalidation of a government act, we 
think the answer is no. As we have said already, Marbury does not 
justify aggressive, rather than deferential, judicial review because 
it does not engage the question of deference at all. And the 
constitutional analysis Marbury performs is perfunctory, 
unconvincing, and disingenuous. It may be strategically clever, 
but partisan wile is the last thing judges should want to associate 
their opinions with. 
 
 182. This terminology is used by Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 
90 VA. L. REV. 1 (2004), and Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the 
Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2005). 
 183. Eric Segall, defending Marbury’s inclusion in the first year curriculum, argues 
that McCulloch contains “little … about the Court’s relationship to the other branches of 
the national government,” while Marbury discusses “the Supreme Court’s role in relation 
to the other branches.” Segall, supra note 178, at 584. We think this is wrong; in fact, 
backwards. McCulloch does discuss the legislative process leading up to the passage of the 
Bank bill and its significance; preceding that discussion with Madison’s speech and the 
opinions of Washington’s Cabinet shows the operation of all three branches. By contrast, 
Marbury offers only simplistic slogans about the rule of law that ignore the role and 
competencies of the other branches. 
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As far as teaching goes, we think the value of Marbury is also 
quite overstated. The opinion does, of course, offer arguments in 
favor of judicial review. But presenting those to students is, in our 
view, counterproductive. First, it misleads students about history, 
by suggesting that judicial review was controversial and in need of 
establishment. As scholars have pointed out, this was not so.184 
(Strikingly, the Judiciary Act of 1789 itself explicitly contemplates 
judicial review, since it provides for Supreme Court review of 
state high court decisions invalidating federal statutes or 
sustaining state statutes against federal constitutional 
challenges.185) Second, and perhaps more significant, it focuses 
students’ attention on the existence of judicial review rather than 
its exercise—it suggests, that is, that we should think about how 
the institution can be justified, rather than the question of when 
judicial review should be aggressive and when it should be 
deferential. This is precisely the mistake that Alexander Bickel 
made.186 The fact that a generation of scholars followed him in 
setting their lances for the countermajoritarian difficulty does not 
make it any less a windmill. 
Still, as long as Marbury retains its talismanic role in judicial 
opinions, it might be going too far to omit it from the first-year 
course entirely. Our modest proposal is that Marbury be 
presented later—and that, when it is presented, it should be 
portrayed neither as the establishment of judicial review nor as a 
shining moment in Supreme Court history. Instead, it should be 
revealed for what it is. That is, a sort of Frankenstein’s monster, a 
decision whose many unconvincing elements are a consequence 
of a fundamentally inappropriate approach to constitutional 
decisionmaking—but, for all that, a symbol which, having sparked 
to life, we may now be incapable of killing.187 
 
 184. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, How Great were the “Great” Marshall Court 
Decisions, 87 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1113–15 (2001); William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review 
Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455 (2005). 
 185. See § 25; See generally Mark A. Graber, Establishing Judicial Review: Marbury 
and the Judiciary Act of 1789, 38 TULSA L. REV. 609 (2003). 
 186. See supra text accompanying notes 92–93. 
 187. One way to do this, we suggest, is to present McCulloch as a model of good 
judicial behavior and plausible choices about deference and Marbury as an example of bad 
behavior and failure to address the issue of deference. 
